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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to explain peasant protest in Kyrgyzstan in both the Akaev era 
and the post-Akaev era through an analysis of five case studies spanning both periods.  
This thesis finds that during the Akaev era, successful mobilization occurred in the rural 
areas, when protestors were able to project their agendas and anger beyond the local 
arena.  By framing the original issue of grievance as an issue of national concern, and 
employing aggressive methods of redress, such as road blockades and occupation of 
public space, Akaev-era protestors met with success on two of three occasions.  The post-
Akaev era has been marked by a transition to urban-based protests, which has reduced the 
methods of redress available to protestors and elicited mixed results.  Throughout the 
cases studied, the motivations of the peasant protestors is best explained by a loss-
aversion theory of human behavior, which stipulates that actors will accept high risks of 
action when they perceive that they have lost something previously attained.  While 
peasants are traditionally thought of as conservative and risk-averse, the Kyrgyzstani 
peasantry has displayed a willingness not just to initiate protest, but to sustain protest 
until such a time as such losses have been regained. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.................................................................3 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN.....................................................................................5 
D. SOURCES.........................................................................................................6 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE.....................................................................................6 
II. PROTEST IN AKAEV’S KYRGYZSTAN ...............................................................9 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................9 
B. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................9 
1. Kara-Buura ..........................................................................................9 
2. Aksy.....................................................................................................12 
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED ............................................13 
1. Frame Alignment and Frame Resonance ........................................13 
2. Cultural Repertoire of Redress.........................................................17 
D. PEASANT REBELLION THEORY............................................................20 
1. Kara-Buura ........................................................................................20 
2. Aksy.....................................................................................................21 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................22 
III. THE MARCH EVENTS ...........................................................................................23 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................23 
B. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................23 
1. Changing from Bicameral to Unicameral........................................23 
2. Otunbaeva...........................................................................................25 
3. The Run-up: The Week Before the Election ...................................27 
4. Round 1: Between the First and Second Round of Voting ............28 
5. The End: After the Second Round until Akaev’s Ouster...............30 
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED ............................................33 
1. Frame Alignment ...............................................................................33 
2. Frame Resonance ...............................................................................35 
3. Cultural Repertoire of Redress.........................................................36 
D. PEASANT REBELLION THEORY............................................................39 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................40 
IV. PROTEST IN POST-AKAEV KYRGYZSTAN.....................................................41 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................41 
B. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................41 
1. The Akmatbaev Affair.......................................................................41 
2. The Opposition's Struggle.................................................................45 
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED ............................................51 
1. Frame Resonance ...............................................................................51 
2. Cultural Repertoire of Redress.........................................................56 
D. PEASANT REBELLION THEORY............................................................60 
 viii
1. The Akmatbaev Affair.......................................................................60 
2. The Opposition...................................................................................61 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................62 
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS .........................................................................65 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................65 
B. THE IMPACT OF TIME AND SPACE ON PROTEST ...........................65 
C. PEASANT REBELLION THEORY............................................................68 
D. CONSIDERATIONS OUTSIDE THE THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK..............................................................................................70 
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE.......................................................70 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................73 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................89 
 ix
 LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1:  Map of major roads in Kyrgyzstan .......................................................... 22 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. List of Cultural Repertoire techniques used in Akaev era protests… 18 
Table 2. Summation of peasant rebellion analysis…………………………... 68 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Listen to Mustn'ts, child, listen to the Don'ts. 
Listen to the Shouldn'ts, the Impossibles, the Won'ts. 
Listen to the Never Haves, then listen close to me. 
Anything can happen, child, Anything can be. 
 
— Shel Silverstein 
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION 
What happened yesterday, named the revolution of tulips or narcissuses is 
a real people’s revolution.  People that entered the White House were not 
led by the opposition leaders.  The situation only developed that way.  As 
it was a people’s revolution, now policies should be implemented in the 
interest of the people of Kyrgyzstan. 
       — Bishkek Elnura1 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since President Askar Akaev fled Kyrgyzstan on 24 March 2005 in the face of 
nationwide protests surrounding the parliamentary elections of that February, the country 
has witnessed an unprecedented amount of political activity.  From prisoners to 
pensioners, post-Akaev Kyrgyzstan has seen all strata of citizens taking to the street in an 
effort to redress grievances with the local, regional, and national government, an act 
hitherto unknown in all of independent Central Asia.2  In reality, the democratic character 
and impact of such demonstrations remains questionable despite the trappings of 
democracy in the “Tulip Revolution” and ensuing protests.3  Formally, a prescribed 
structure of democratic procedure has yet to take hold, while the informal social protests 
that brought down the Akaev regime have become a common part of the Kyrgyzstani 
political landscape.4  Although the current government has attempted a partial revival of 
Akaev’s authoritarianism, the Kyrgyzstani population has consistently rebuffed such 
                                                 
1 Soros Foundation Kyrgyzstan. The Spring of 2005 Through the Eyes of People of Kyrgyzstan: 
Anxieties, Expectations, and Hopes (Oral Histories) (Bishkek: Soros Foundation Kyrgyzstan, 2005), 51. 
2 “Kyrgyz Parliament Discusses Prison Riot, Deputy’s Death.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 21 
October 2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/F18AABDF-A0DB-4481-BC8D-
4DC96494A5A9.html (accessed June 15, 2007); Pannier, Bruce. “Kyrgyzstan: Prison Riots, Protests, 
Parliament, and the Prime Minister.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 25 October 2005, 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/3e586d00-49b2-4d8f-aa64-8a54ca9c8165.html (accessed June 
15, 2007). 
3 International Crisis Group, Kyrgyzstan on the Edge (Bishkek: International Crisis Group, 2006), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4495&l=1 (accessed June 15, 2007); Scott Radnitz, “What 
Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 6 (2006): 132-146. 
4 “Kyrgyz PM Airs Concerns over Constitution Process,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 10 
November 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/11/FB05D8FE-2217-42B4-B06E-
80C1A8968B45.html (accessed June 15, 2007). 
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attempts through multiple-day protest events.5  As the government struggles for 
definition, mobilized Kyrgyzstanis are shaping their future political institutions, some at 
the behest of their patrons, others for their own concerns, all with consequences for future 
generations—indelibly shaping the form of debate and the understanding of democracy in 
Kyrgyzstan.   
At the heart of these protests has been the Kyrgyzstani peasantry, which is 
surprising considering that peasants are commonly thought of as constituting some of the 
most conservative, risk-averse and least mobilized members of society.  While the 
peasantry has not constituted the leadership of the protest movements, the fact remains 
that they have left their land to enact political protests on an unprecedented scale, which 
not only led to the ousting of President Akaev after fifteen years of rule, but continues to 
play a decisive role in Kyrgyzstani politics. 
The current presidential administration, elected in July 2005 by the most open 
elections in Central Asian history, was born out of the protests surrounding the Tulip 
Revolution, which is crucial to understanding the current political situation in 
Kyrgyzstan.  Having come to power as a direct result of popular protest, the current 
presidential administration is beholden to the support of the populous to a greater extent 
than was Akaev at any point in his tenure.  In contrast to the Akaev era when protest 
actions were few, the protests that have ensued in the post-Akaev era have been 
numerous and comparatively less violent.6  Despite the increased levels of political 
participation, the elites, the governmental structure, and the population of Kyrgyzstan 
have remained unchanged from the Akaev period with the exception of a single politician  
 
 
                                                 
5 “Kyrgyzstan: Thousands Demonstrate Against Government,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 
April 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/4/488BDAAD-D6CC-46A5-9B55-
5C57772F0FDB.html (accessed June 15, 2007). 
6 “Demonstration in Bishkek Ends Without Incident,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 31 March 
2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/3/EA90379C-C8D8-441A-91A7-9E6E8AE0C9DF.html 
(accessed June 15, 2007); “Hundreds Pay Tribute to Slain Imam,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 
August 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/8/E016ADD3-B9BE-4D90-B2AB-
18B3C15DA68B.html (accessed June 15, 2007). 
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released from prison.  That is to say, ceteris paribus, the most significant change in the 
Kyrgyzstani political landscape since the ousting of Akaev has been the increased 
participation of the peasantry.   
This thesis seeks to explain why Kyrgyzstani peasants were willing to protest, 
how these protests are becoming an institutionalized feature of Kyrgyz politics and the 
implications of this for the political development of Kyrgyzstan.  Specifically, through an 
analysis of two case studies that occurred during the Akaev era, the 2005 Tulip 
Revolution, and two case studies in the post-Akaev era, this thesis seeks to answer three 
questions—under what conditions do peasants initiate, sustain and conclude protest 
events?   
B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to assess the evolution and impact of political participation in 
Kyrgyzstani politics from the Akaev to post-Akaev era, this thesis combines social 
mobilization and peasant rebellion theory.  This thesis relies heavily on the social 
mobilization explanation of activism, which has attempted to give greater depth to the 
origins of grievance, and to reinterpret the rational-actor model in a setting reflective of 
contemporary reality.7  Concepts such as group identity (ethnic, gender, national, and 
religious), locality-based interpretations of grievances and resources, and the idea of a 
shared-fate amongst individuals trumping the free-rider mentality, have given political 
protest literature a more nuanced understanding of why and how protests occur.8  
Bridging the gap between the individual and the collective involves an interactive 
relationship between the individual and her environment.  Chief among these factors is 
the idea of a “frame,” the schemata by which events and communication are interpreted 
amongst a shared collective, which serves as a bridge between events and the ability of a 
                                                 
7 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, Social Movements in an Organizational Society (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transition Books, 1987); Carol McClurg Mueller, “Building Social Movement Theory,” In 
Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, edited by Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, 3-25. (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992). 
8 McClurg Mueller, “Building Social Movement.”  
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collective to organize.9  As all frames occur in a larger political and cultural setting, the 
process by which those frames are constructed—frame alignment—and received by an 
audience—frame resonance—is of utmost importance for mobilization.10  In turn, the 
ability to act on a frame is dependent on the available range of protest actions known to a 
populace, such as protests, marches, sit-ins, etc., termed the “cultural repertoire” in social 
mobilization theory.  This thesis will examine frame alignment and resonance, along with 
the evolution of the Kyrgyzstani cultural repertoire, as exemplified by protest events from 
the Akaev era to the present. 
As noted, the role of the peasantry in the events leading up to and following the 
ousting of Akaev has grown, ushering in an era of unparalleled political activity and a 
seemingly fundamental shift of the peasantry’s role in the political arena, which dictates 
that this analysis evaluate other explanations of protest that highlight the role of the 
peasant.11  Defining the moments in time when mobilized peasants chose to act and how 
each protest event relates to the larger history of peasant protest in Kyrgyzstan requires 
looking towards the relationship between the peasantry and risk, i.e. the motivating 
factors of action.  To analyze such a relationship, this thesis compares the actions of the 
peasantry using two perspectives relying on fundamentally different assumptions: that 
actors will only take risk at the prospect of losing something and that actors are risk-
neutral, and will act when benefits of action outweigh costs.  For the former, this thesis 
draws on Scott's The Moral Economy of the Peasant, and Kahneman and Tversky’s 
prospect theory to define loss-averse behavior as risk-acceptant action employed only 
when the participants are hostile to the potential for the loss of something previously 
                                                 
9 Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, “Introduction: Why Emotions Matter,” In 
Rethinking Social Movements, edited by Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, 1-24. (Boulder, CO: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2004). 
10 Rhys H. Williams and Timothy J. Kubal, “Movement Frames and the Cultural Environment: 
Resonance, Failure, and the Boundaries of the Legitimate,” Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and 
Change 21, (1999): 225-48. 
11 Crisis Group, Kyrgyzstan on the Edge.  
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gained.12  At the other end of the spectrum, this thesis extrapolates from Samuel Popkin’s 
theory of political economy as articulated in The Rational Peasant, and employs a 
standard rationalist assumption that is risk-neutral in decision making and focuses on 
cost-benefit calculations of continuing or challenging the status quo patron-client system, 
assuming that the costs of change are worthwhile only when the rewards from 
maintenance of the status quo have become too small.13   
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is divided across two timeframes, the Akaev era and the post-Akaev 
era.  While it is tempting to use of the term “Tulip Revolution” to describe the events of 
winter 2005 in Kyrgyzstan that led to Akaev’s ouster, to do so would betray not just the 
reality on the ground, but also improperly divide the timeframe under analysis.  As the 
author was told numerous times on his research trip to Kyrgyzstan in the autumn of 2006, 
the exact terminology for the events has yet to be agreed upon, rather the terms “coup,” 
“March Events,” and “revolution,” were all used interchangeably.  To delineate a 
timeframe in keeping with the actual events, this thesis divides the periods of analysis 
into the Akaev and post-Akaev era, in which the protests of March 2005—commonly 
called the “Tulip Revolution” in the West—are classified as part of the Akaev era, and 
referred to as the March Events. 
During the Akaev era, two major protests occurring prior to the March Events will 
be evaluated: first, the political events surrounding the Kara-Buura parliamentary 
elections of 2000 in Talas province; and the events surrounding the Aksy shooting of 
2002.  These proceedings were selected for evaluation as they were the two greatest 
political upheavals against the Akaev regime prior to March 2005, and neither protest 
fully met its stated goals.  The events leading to Akaev’s ouster in March 2005 will be 
                                                 
12 James C. Scott. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976); Prospect theory, as defined by Kahneman and Tversky, is 
a predictive tool, but not a tool of reasoning, which leaves room for the incorporation of social movement 
theory to account for the motivation for specific choices. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” In Choices, Values and Frames, edited by Daniel Kahneman 
and Kahneman Tversky, 17-43. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
13 Samuel L. Popkin. The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979). 
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examined and treated as a part of the Akaev era timeframe, and as a single protest event 
that began in January 2005 and culminated two months later with Akaev fleeing the 
country.  In the post-Akaev era, two major protests will be evaluated: firstly, the 
Akmatbaev affair which saw the deaths of two brothers, one a parliamentarian and the 
other a reputed mobster; and secondly, the opposition’s major protest events spanning the 
year between April 2006 and April 2007.  These events were the most widely attended 
and vociferous of the post-Akaev era, and they also represent instances where, at the 
conclusion of protest action, both gains and losses were suffered by the protestors. 
Given that all of the protest events to be examined have occurred since 1999, the 
importance of each in the historical context of Kyrgyzstan's emergence as an independent 
nation is fundamental to analysis.  While the primary thrust of the research examines 
events at the micro level, each of these occurrences informs the macro level history of 
protest in Kyrgyzstan and will continue to influence the future not just of protest but of 
democratic redress in Kyrgyzstan.  
D. SOURCES 
This thesis relies on secondary sources of information when collecting data 
regarding protest actions together with primary source material gathered from the 
author’s research trip to Kyrgyzstan in September 2006.  These sources include journal 
and newspaper accounts of protests in both English and local languages, which will serve 
as the basis for the case studies.  Given the nature of the research question, the theoretical 
framework to be outlined will incorporate the works of leading social mobilization 
scholars such as Gamson, McCarthy and Zald, along with Moore’s, Popkin’s and Scott's 
contributions on peasant participation in political rebellion.  The exact identities of the 
author’s interviewees have been withheld at the behest of each interview subject. 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II will examine the two cases of protest in the Akaev era and apply the 
theoretical framework to elicit findings of each instance.  The chapter will conclude with 
a comparative analysis of case-study findings in the Akaev era.  Chapter III will examine 
the events that lead to the ousting of President Akaev and apply the theoretical 
 7
framework to each protest.  The chapter will end with an analysis of how the events both 
concluded the Akaev era and set the stage for continued protest in the post-Akaev era.  
Chapter IV will examine the two major protest events of the post-Akaev era.  
Specifically, the chapter focuses on the Akmatbaev brother’s ability to mobilize local 
constituents and the on-going attempt of the opposition party to mobilize for 
governmental reform.  The chapter will further compare the impact of urban-based 
protest Kyrgyzstani politics.  Chapter V concludes by analyzing the impact of time and 
space on protest in Kyrgyzstan, the limitations of the theoretical analysis, the implications 
peasant participation in protest and the impact of protest on the democratic development 
of Kyrgyzstan. 
 8
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II. PROTEST IN AKAEV’S KYRGYZSTAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines two case studies during the Akaev era in which the rural 
peasantry openly and vociferously demonstrated against the Akaev regime.  The next 
section articulates the background of the two protest events.  The following section, 
analyzes why the protesters mobilized, applying social mobilization theory focusing on 
frames and the cultural repertoire employed.  The subsequent section analyzes peasant 
participation in terms of loss-aversion and risk-neutral peasant rebellion theory.  Finally, 
the conclusion brings the two analytical pieces together and attempts to place each event 
within the larger context Kyrgyzstani protest. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The two protest events garnering greatest attention during the Akaev era occurred 
slightly over two years apart and in separate parts of the country.  In the Kara-Buura 
region of Talas Oblast (province) the perceived manipulation of parliamentary elections 
results in 2000 sparked the ire of the local peasantry and gave rise to organized and 
openly defiant anti-Akaev demonstrations.  Two years later, in the Aksy region of 
Jalalabad Province, anti-Akaev protests resulted in the deaths of seven people from 
clashes between protestors and police.  Taken together, these events represented the 
greatest challenge to Akaev during his tenure.   
1. Kara-Buura 
To understand the Kara-Buura protests of 2000, a brief history of Feliks Kulov, 
the former prime minister, is necessary as without Kulov, the events of 2000 would never 
have occurred.  Often described as the “Putin of Kyrgyzstan”—after Russian President 
and ex-KGB agent Vladimir Putin—for his career in the security sector and perceived 
“strongman” persona, Kulov’s reputation has been built on both his law-enforcement past 
and the events leading to his four years in a Bishkek jail on questionable charges brought 
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by the Akaev regime.14  Once thought of as Akaev’s heir apparent, Kulov broke ranks 
with his long time political ally in April of 1999 and resigned as Mayor of Bishkek in 
protest over Akaev’s tolerance of “anti-democratic activities” by members of the 
presidential inner circle.15  Shortly thereafter Kulov formed his own opposition party Ar-
Namys (Integrity) in an attempt to challenge the ruling regime not just for parliamentary 
power but for the presidency as well.  This act—the founding of an opposition party—
was not an unprecedented political occurrence in Kyrgyzstan, as opposition parties 
already operated within the republic, but the Akaev regime’s reaction to this event 
irrevocably shaped Kyrgyzstani politics.   
After registering Ar-Namys in August of 1999, the party was banned from running 
in the parliamentary elections of 2000 under an obscure 1991 election code law that 
required a political party be registered for at least one year prior to an election in order to 
participate. 16  When an appeals process came to no avail, Kulov chose to run as an 
independent candidate for the Kara-Buura parliamentary constituency of Talas Province.  
Despite the presence of observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe monitoring the vote, Kulov was not declared an outright winner and was forced 
into a run-off in a second round of voting, which resulted in a victory for Kulov’s 
                                                 
14 Fred Weir, “Rivals’ struggle locks Kyrgyzstan in power vacuum,” The Christian Science Monitor, 
March 28, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0328/p01s04-wosc.htm (accessed June 15, 2007).  
15 Liz Fuller, “Backtracking in Bishkek,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, February 15, 2000, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200001/0003.html (accessed June 15, 2007).  
16 “Another Kyrgyz Opposition Party Faces Election Restrictions,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, January 
04, 2000, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200001/0003.html (accessed June 15, 
2007). 
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opponent.17  Reaction to this situation was swift as Kulov supporters in the Kara-Buura 
constituency and in the capital, Bishkek, rallied to protest the election results.18   
In between the first and second round of voting, on 6 March 2000, Kulov declared 
his intention to run for the presidency in elections scheduled for October of the same 
year.  During the rally not only did Kulov declare his candidacy, but also stated that he 
favored abolishing the position of President of Kyrgyzstan in favor of a parliamentary 
system.19  Less than three weeks later, after “losing” the contested parliamentary seat, on 
22 March, Kulov was arrested and charged with “abuse of authority” relating to actions 
initiated while he was Minister of National Security from 1996-1998.20  Given the timing 
and the charges, the ensuing trial of Kulov was believed to be orchestrated from on 
high.21  Substantiating such suspicion was the venue in which Kulov was tried, a military 
court that was closed to the public.  Nonetheless on 7 August 2000, he was found not 
guilty and released.22  Slightly more than a month later, the original not-guilty verdict 
was annulled, and the military court requested an investigation into the veracity of the 
                                                 
17 “OSCE Registers Flaws in Kyrgyz Poll,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, February 23, 2000, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200002/0037.html (accessed January 15, 2007). 
18 “Defeated Kyrgyz Parliamentary Candidate Alleges Fraud,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, March 15, 
2000, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200003/0027.html (accessed June 15, 
2007); “Protest Demonstrations Continue in Kyrgyzstan,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, March 16, 2000, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200003/0030.html (accessed June 15, 2007); 
“Protest Update by KCHR,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, March 20, 2000, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200003/0039.html (accessed June 15, 2007); 
“Updates of yesterday developments,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, March 23, 2000, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200003/0047.html (accessed June 15, 2007); 
“Latest Developments in Kyrgyzstan,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, March 30, 2000, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200003/0063.html (accessed June 15, 2007). 
19 “Kyrgyz Opposition Party Leader Announces Presidential Candidacy,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, 
March 06, 2000, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200003/0008.html (accessed 
June 15, 2007). 
20 “Closed Trial of Opposition Leader to be Held in Kyrgyzstan,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, March 18, 
2000, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200005/0031.html (accessed June 15, 
2007).  
21 International Crisis Group, Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution (Bishkek: International Crisis Group, 
2005), http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3411&l=1 (accessed June 15, 2007). 
22 “Kyrgyz Opposition Politician Acquitted,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, August 8, 2000, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200008/0014.html (accessed June 15, 2007). 
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original decision.23  Shortly thereafter Kulov declared that he would not run for the 
presidency because he believed that taking the state language test, as required by all 
presidential candidates by the Central Election Commission, was unconstitutional.  
Instead he threw his support behind another candidate.24  On 22 January 2001, the 
Bishkek City Military Court convicted Feliks Kulov of the same charges of which he was 
originally acquitted and sentenced him to seven years imprisonment.25   
2. Aksy 
Aksy, Kyrgyzstan was never thought of as a hot bed of political activity, but on 5 
January 2002, the people in this small region of Kyrgyzstan would further the process of 
turning the peasantry into viable force in Kyrgyzstani politics and do so in a time frame 
of less than three months.  On that same day, Azimbek Beknazarov, the local 
parliamentarian representing the Aksy region in Jalalabad Province, was arrested on 
charges of “abuse of power.”26  The charges related to a murder case in which 
Beknazarov, as an investigator in the Toktogul District Prosecutor’s office in 1995, 
cleared the accused of murder by finding that the act was committed in self defense.  
Again, as with Kulov, the timing of the arrest was important.  Beknazarov had recently 
complained publicly about an agreement signed by Akaev with the Chinese Premier that, 
in combination with a previously signed agreement, ceded 125,000 hectares of 
Kyrgyzstani land to China.  For months leading up to the arrest, Beknazarov claimed that 
Akaev was ceding sacred ground to both China and Kazakhstan that also contained 
untapped Kyrgyzstani natural resources.27  While imprisoned and awaiting trail, 
                                                 
23 “Court Annuls Kyrgyz Opposition Leader’s Acquittal,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, September 12, 
2000, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200009/0035.html (accessed June 15, 
2007). 
24 “Kulov to Back Parliament Deputy Speaker in Kyrgyz Presidential Poll,” Kyrgyz Daily Digest, 
September 21, 2000, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200009/0067.html 
(accessed June 15, 2007). 
25 “Kyrgyz Oppositionist Sentenced to Seven Years Imprisonment,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, January 
22, 2001, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200101/0049.html (accessed June 15, 
2007). 
26 Ron Synovitz, “Kyrgyzstan: Arrest of Deputy Sparks Allegations of Persecution,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, January 9, 2002, http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/01/09012002082600.asp 
(accessed June 15, 2007). 
27 Ibid. 
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Beknazarov’s supporters organized in Aksy and began to protest his detention.  On 17 
March 2002, the protests came to a head when five Beknazarov supporters were killed by 
the security forces on a march towards the regional center after having been promised a 
meeting with a local official, who never arrived.  After the shootings the Beknazarov 
issue garnered greater attention and the issues which drove protest expanded to include 
“justice” for the shootings.  Ultimately, the protestors forced the resignation of first the 
Jalalabad Province governor, then the chief prosecutor, and then Kyrgyzstani Prime 
Minister, Kurmanbek Bakiev.  Beknazarov was eventually cleared of all charges and 
reinstated as a member of Parliament only after Akaev granted a presidential pardon for 
his one-year suspended sentence; however the leaders of the local law enforcement 
bodies were not held accountable for the shootings and were granted amnesty.28   
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED 
1. Frame Alignment and Frame Resonance 
a. Kulov and Kara-Buura 
In both the Kara-Buura and Aksy incidents, Akaev had unparalleled 
resources with which to frame his opponents; however, in neither locale did the frame 
resonate to the point of preventing or discouraging protest actions by the peasantry.  The 
Kara-Buura incident is important in that the entire situation began as an attempt by the 
incumbent, Akaev, to maintain his power over the perceived threat from a challenger, 
Kulov, and evolved into an issue of competing identities.  To begin with, Akaev, as 
president, used his vertical network of officials from the executive branch, the judicial 
branch and the electoral commission at the national and local levels, to implement his 
frame of Kulov as a “corrupt” politician.  Such means combined with the sheer extent to 
which Akaev attempted to align his frame of Kulov as a corrupt official—party 
disqualification, vote-rigging—twice, and corruption charges—twice, suggested that not 
only the president, but the institutions he headed were culpable in the entire affair.  
                                                 
28 Scott Radnitz, “Networks, localism and mobilization in Aksy, Kyrgyzstan,” Central Asian Survey 
24, no. 4 (2005): 405-424; “...And Fires Region’s Top Officials,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, April 11, 2002, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200204/0036.shtml (accessed June 15, 2007); 
Adam Albion, “Kyrgyz Prime Minister, Cabinet Step Down,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, May 23, 2002, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200205/0063.shtml (accessed June 15, 2007). 
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Despite these vast resources, Akaev’s frame did not resonate as public opinion in Kara-
Buura remained on the side of Kulov.  Instead Akaev’s frame of corruption backfired 
against the entire governmental system which he headed as Kulov supporters protested 
the fraudulent election returns, along with the “corruption” charges brought in court.  
Supporting the idea of institutional corruption was the suicide of the Kara-Buura head 
election official.  Not to mention the confessions of a second local Kara-Buura election 
official, and a television journalist, both of whom publicly stated that governmental 
officials had offered bribes at the behest of inflicting as much damage as was possible on 
the Kulov campaign.29  Adding to this was the statement by the presiding judge in the 
first Kulov case that while Kulov’s guilt was not proven, “his acquittal was just.”30  
These statements from players complicit in the affair reveal both the extent to which 
Akaev’s administration attempted to align the frame of Kulov as corrupt, and the absolute 
failure of such a frame to resonate with the populace.  Importantly, this lack of resonance 
was not only with the public, but those in positions of influence as well.  The result was 
that Kulov’s reputation expanded to include an underdog persona as he took on the 
Akaev administration.   
The frame used by Akaev that Kulov was “corrupt” and “abused his 
authority” did not resonate with the public because the reasoning behind the charge 
implicated the regime itself.  Without regard to the timeline of the events, Akaev, in 
asking the public to accept Kulov as a corrupt official, did not give enough weight to the 
logic involved.  For the frame of Kulov as a corrupt official to resonate, the public had 
also to accept the fact that Akaev was either inept or corrupt himself.  As Minister of 
National Security, Kulov’s chain of command began and ended with Akaev, yet in 
                                                 
29 “Protests in Kyrgyz Capital Continue,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, March 20, 2000, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200003/0036.html (accessed June 15, 2000); 
“More Revelations of Poll Falsification in Kyrgyzstan,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, March 24, 2006, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200003/0041.html (accessed June 15, 2007); 
“Bishkek Protesters Address Demands to Kyrgyz Leadership,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, March 21, 2000, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200003/0040.html (accessed June 15, 2007); 
“Kyrgyz TV journalist said he was asked to slander opposition leaders,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, February 
14, 2000, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200002/0022.html (accessed June 15, 
2007). 
30 “Kyrgyz Officials Seek to Justify Kulov Verdict,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, January 29, 2001, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200101/0075.html (accessed June 15, 2007). 
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bringing the corruption charges, Akaev’s frame reasoned that Kulov somehow acted 
outside of the purview of the most powerful man in the republic, Akaev.  Had Kulov been 
a middle or low level bureaucrat, someone considerably removed from the president, then 
Akaev’s impunity would have made sense, however, as Kulov was one person removed 
from the president, accepting the corruption frame as true dictated that either Akaev was 
clueless as to the behavior of his minister, or condoned the behavior, but chose not to act 
until politically advantageous.   
Framing Kulov as a corrupt official did the most damage to Akaev as this 
frame actually reflected back upon the president rather than the accused.  Beginning with 
the denial of registration to Kulov’s Ar-Namys party and culminating with the seven year 
prison sentence, Kulov appeared as a politician trying to “play by the rules,” but stopped 
by the institutional apparatus.  Moreover, with the verdict pending, on 5 January 2001, 
Kulov was urged to leave the country and go into exile, rather than suffer the 
consequences of an unlawful trial.  Kulov refused.31  Thus, Kulov’s acceptance of his 
imprisonment created not just an anti-Akaev identity, but also an identity of a man of 
integrity, which subsequently cemented his place in Kyrgyzstani lore as the sole man 
willing to stand up to the corruption of the president.  This series of events solidified the 
battle of collective identities that would erupt later and lay the foundation for the Aksy 
protests between those that supported the integrity of the anti-Akaev resistance and the 
corruption of the Akaev-led establishment. 
b. Beknazarov 
At the time of his arrest, Kulov was essentially arguing for genuine 
democracy, an abstract political system and concept favored by the West, while at the 
time of Beknazarov’s arrest, the embattled parliamentarian was arguing for something 
tangible, Kyrgyzstani land, sovereignty and natural resources.  In so doing, Beknazarov 
was framing from a nationalist standpoint, which meant anyone who disagreed was either 
a traitor, or a Chinese puppet.  As with Kulov, the charges against Beknazarov originated 
                                                 
31 “Kyrgyz Opposition Party Advises Leader to Leave Country,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, January 5, 
2001, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200101/0017.html (accessed June 15, 
2007). 
 16
from violations of a past governmental position, and were designed to paint Beknazarov 
as a “corrupt official.”  Akaev’s attempts to label Beknazarov failed to resonate not just 
for the reasons already articulated (ineptitude or complicity), but because Beknazarov’s 
frame resonated easily.  Beknazarov’s reasoning was that the proposed treaty put 
Kyrgyzstan on the losing end of the deal on not one, but two fronts; firstly, the manner in 
which the treaty was proposed and signed by Akaev subjugated the Kyrgyzstani 
parliamentary process of legislation to Chinese financial interests; and secondly, the land 
that was being ceded contained potential renewable resources.32  In making this argument 
Beknazarov overtly appealed to the Kyrgyzstani sense of nationalism, while covertly 
attempting to exploit Kyrgyzstani xenophobia of the Chinese.  As for Akaev’s frame, he 
asked the people to accept the fact that despite the passage of almost seven years since 
the original investigation, during which time Beknazarov had been promoted to Chief 
Investigator for the Jalalabad Oblast office, then to Judge of the October Regional Court 
in Bishkek, and finally elected by his own constituents, the charges against Beknazarov 
had nothing to do with the parliamentarian’s outspokenness and constituted the proper 
punishments of a corrupt official. 33  Failing to take into account the lingering memory of 
the Kulov incident, Akaev underestimated the possible consequences of leveling such 
charges against Beknazarov.  By reverting back to the corrupt official frame, Akaev 
failed to shift his efforts at frame alignment from the man to the larger issue of equity for 
the Kyrgyzstani people in the face of Chinese pressure and in turn, his frame again failed 
to resonate.  Unable to frame himself as pro-Kyrgyzstani without risking problematic 
relations with the Chinese, Akaev’s continued framing Beknazarov only helped to give 




                                                 
32 A. Beknozarov, “To safe (sic) our fatherland!,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, June 13, 2001, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200106/0036.html (accessed June 15, 2007).  
33 “Kyrgyz Presidential Election,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
http://www.rferl.org/specials/kyrgyzelections/bios/Beknazarov.asp (accessed June 15, 2007). 
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2. Cultural Repertoire of Redress 
As has been well documented by Scott Radnitz, the Aksy events were a watershed 
in Central Asian political history. 34  Unlike Kara-Buura, where the protestors were 
unable to attain the stated goal and the event dissipated after clashes with the security 
forces, the Aksy events were successful and gained more momentum after clashing with 
local security forces.  While the Kara-Buura events are distinguished due to the 
unprecedented showing of popular discontent with the central authority, the Aksy events 
are marked by the actual results and scale of effectiveness reflected in the resignations of 
multiple government officials, including the prime minister and the reinstatement of 
Beknazarov to his parliamentary post.  The various techniques used by both the Kara-
Buura and Aksy protestors, the cultural repertoire, were not completely original, yet the 
outcome in the Aksy case was truly unique.  Table 1 lists the various methods of civil 
disobedience that comprised the cultural repertoire of both the Kara-Buura and Aksy 
events.  This list represents all techniques used by the constituency when advocating for 
the respective cause, which in the case of Kara-Buura began with the vote rigging of 
2000 and culminated with Kulov’s imprisonment in early 2001, whereas the Aksy events 










                                                 
34 Radnitz, “Networks.”  
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Table 1.   List of Cultural Repertoire techniques used in Akaev era protests 
Cultural Repertoire  Kulov/Kara-Buura 2000 Beknazarov/Aksy 2002 
Hunger Strike(individual) Yes Yes 
Hunger Strike(supporters) Yes Yes 
Kurultai (people’s council) Yes Yes 
Sit-in Yes Yes 
Occupation of 
Administrative building Yes Yes 
Occupation of public space Yes Yes 
Marches  No Yes 
Road Blockade No Yes 
Petition drive No Yes 
Withholding Children from 
School No Yes 
Hostage Taking No Yes 
Torching of Ak-ui 
(administrative building) No Yes 
 
When comparing the different cultural repertoires of the Kara-Buura and Aksy 
groups, the similarities suggest that the Aksy group, coming later chronologically, 
adopted and expanded the techniques of the Kara-Buura group.  Of the new techniques 
employed by the Aksy group, the marches and road blockade appear to be the major 
difference in efficacy as these techniques transplanted the overall cause outside the local 
area.  The effectiveness of the petition drive, while not concretely known, can be 
assumed to be negligible in comparison to the sheer numbers of protestors that turned out 
in support of Beknazarov.  Withholding children from school during the winter time 
occurs quite frequently in Kyrgyzstan due to the poor medical facilities and scarce 
availability of local doctors, vaccines, and medicines.  While the technique of “torching 
the local administrative building” appears as an extreme measure, this event occurred 
after the state had initiated a violent crackdown against the protesters, and thus was 
reactive.  Here Kara-Buura and Aksy depart in that after the state initiated a violent 
crackdown in the former, the major protest was effectively quashed, while in Aksy, state 
initiated violence actually caused a violent reaction from protestors, and energized the 
protest.  The effectiveness of taking hostages is slightly less clear, but possibly negligible 
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in the larger picture as Beknazarov supporters did take local administration officials 
hostage prior to the Aksy shootings, a move which yielded a minor concession, but 
ultimately appears to have not affected the actions of the local government.35  Given all 
of this, the techniques of “marches” and “road blockades” first employed by the Aksy 
group, were the truly effective techniques able to produce results by reaching beyond the 
boundaries of the local constituency. 
The success of these new methods was enormous and a result of the limits of 
Kyrgyzstan’s physical geography.  As with many developing countries, the majority of 
state resources are concentrated in the capital, Bishkek, while the rest of the country is 
left to fend independently.  Kyrgyzstani infrastructural needs are vast as the majority of 
the country’s roads at the time of Kara-Buura and Aksy were and remain in disrepair.  
Complicating this fact is the small size and mountainous geography of the country, which 
limits the connectivity of the provinces to the capital, often to a single two-lane road as 
seen in Figure 1.  Of the two locations in question, Kara-Buura and Aksy, the former is 
not directly connected to the capital, which forces the traveler to either transit through 
Kazakhstan or traverse a mountainous dirt road only open for sporadic periods.  The 
latter straddles the main artery of intra- and interstate commerce, the Bishkek-Osh 
(Kyrgyzstan’s “southern capital”) road, which is the lone road connecting the north and 
south—the country’s main economic artery.   
In addition to these logistical realities, the “north-south” paradigm is also a major 
factor.  While Kyrgyzstan is technically one state, the country is divided along two lines: 
the Russified north and the Uzbek south.  An extension of these identities is that the north 
has always been in control of the state apparatus, and the south has traditionally been 
                                                 
35 Hostages were taken in Aksy by Beknazarov supporters based upon information that Beknazarov 
was beaten while in jail, however the hostages were released a day later after Beknazarov supporters were 
allowed to meet the jailed parliamentarian.  One report of the meeting infers that Beknazarov was 
intimidated into quelling his supporters’ ire by insisting that he had not been beaten, despite visible 
evidence to the contrary; Antoine Blua, “Kyrgyzstan: Protests over Lawmaker’s Arrest Seen as Crucial 
Test for Society,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 11, 2002, 
http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/02/11022002094004.asp (accessed June 15, 2007); “Kyrgyzstan: 
Twelve Hostages Released in Djalalabad,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 19, 2002, 
http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/02/20022002061209.asp (accessed June 15, 2007); “As Supporters Meet 
With Him in Detention...,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, February 20, 2002, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200202/0068.shtml (accessed June 15, 2007).  
 20
politically restive as a result of this power vacuum.  These factors were critically 
important to the cultural repertoire techniques employed by the Kara-Buura and Aksy 
groups, respectively.  
Integral to the success of Aksy were the many marches that Beknazarov’s 
constituents were willing to make.  Rather than allow their cause to remain locally, at the 
district level, the Aksy group took the issue to the provincial capital, Jalalabad (Djalal-
Abad), the original site of the Beknazarov trial, and finally, with smaller numbers to Osh.  
This was unprecedented and a direct confrontation with the provincial authority that 
could not be ignored at any cost, however similar action was not available to the Kara-
Buura group.  Marching to the capital of Talas Province, Talas, and attempting to seize an 
administration building would have meant walking directly into pro-Akaev territory, as 
the president’s wife was from the eastern part of the province, creating the perception of 
Talas as an Akaev power base.36 
As a result of geography, the Aksy group was better positioned to institute a road 
blockade than the Kara-Buura group.  To begin with, the Aksy grouping was positioned 
next to the main economic artery of the country, the Bishkek-Osh road whereas the Kara-
Buura group was located on the periphery of Kyrgyzstan and dependent on trade from 
Kazakhstan, not Bishkek.  For the Aksy group, instituting a road blockade had huge 
economic implications not just for Bishkek but for the entire country.  By instituting the 
blockade the Aksy group signaled to Akaev the numbers, unity and commitment that they 
wielded and a willingness to bring commerce to a halt for their cause. 
D. PEASANT REBELLION THEORY 
1. Kara-Buura 
The actions of the Kara-Buura peasantry do not fit the risk-neutral paradigm, but 
rather align with the loss-averse school.  Integral to the loss-averse paradigm is the belief 
that the peasantry takes risky action when they perceive the loss of something previously 
gained and will continue to employ risky action until that loss has been recouped.  In the 
                                                 
36 Interview with Talas NGO leader, Talas, Kyrgyzstan, September 2006. 
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instance of Kara-Buura, the peasantry began to protest after the first round of voting 
when Kulov was not declared the outright winner and continued to protest through the 
second round of voting, ignoring the announced election results.  The timing and 
vociferous protest action suggests that the peasants were ultimately upset not only with 
Kulov’s loss, but also with the system that delivered Kulov’s loss.  In other words, the 
peasantry voted according to the supposedly democratic system of elections for the 
candidate, Kulov, whom best represented peasant interests, yet when that expectation was 
not met, the same grouping decided to act out.  In directing protest action against both the 
means, the system of voting, and the ends, Kulov’s loss, the peasants were seeking to 
recoup that which they lost, a fair election system, Kulov’s victory, or both.  Had the 
protestors simply advocated for Kulov’s candidacy in a manner befitting cost-benefit 
analysis, then they would accepted the election results. Instead the peasantry risked 
physical, social and economic harm by initiating and sustaining protest against the 
administration.   
2. Aksy 
The actions of the Aksy peasantry also fall in line with the loss-averse school, 
with the 17 March shootings amplifying peasant motivation and goals.  Although the 
peasantry employed and expanded on the cultural repertoire of the Kara-Buura group, the 
explicit expansion of the cultural repertoire was not effectively leveraged until after the 
issue was transformed after the shootings.  With the imprisonment of Beknazarov, and 
the ensuing demonstrations, the peasantry was advocating for Beknazarov’s 
reinstatement, a recouping of their loss of political power.  When the shootings occurred 
however, the losses of the peasantry exponentially grew and the goals of the peasantry 
expanded to include “justice for the dead,” a broader goal that sought accountability from 
government officials for the deaths.  This new goal necessitated an increased intensity 
with which the cultural repertoire was implemented, e.g. longer marches and more 
frequent blockades, in an effort to show local and national officials the power of the 
protesting peasantry.  By taking to the streets in greater numbers, and for a longer period 
of time, the Aksy peasantry did meet with success, yet this success was a direct result 
from the motivation to recoup the loss of political power and the loss of life. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The actions of the Kara-Buura and Aksy protestors represented a major shift in 
Kyrgyzstani domestic politics and the development of democracy in the country.  
Although neither group met with total success, both instances contributed to the history 
of Kyrgyzstani domestic politics indelibly by establishing the idea that the citizenry could 
organize to redress the central government.  Unfortunately for Akaev, the deliberate 
choice to ignore the larger issue that initially motivated the protestors in both 
constituencies, while attacking the man leading the protestors, only served to damage his 
own image.  The rural nature of both protests and the difference in efficacy foreshadowed 
a major weakness which would be exploited during the March Events; the dependency of 




Figure 1:  Map of major roads in Kyrgyzstan 
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III. THE MARCH EVENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes the events of March 2005, known globally as the “Tulip 
Revolution,” but locally referred to as the March Events, when Kyrgyzstan’s first 
president, Askar Akaev, fled the country after months of demonstrations against his 
administration.  In the next section, a history of the events leading to the parliamentary 
elections are given, along with the case of a single politician attempting to contend for a 
seat, whose story served as a prelude of events to come.  Then, a history of the events 
surrounding the elections is presented in three parts: the run-up, which summarizes the 
political maneuvering during the pre-election period in the weeks prior to the 27 February 
2005 poll; round 1, which chronicles the middle stages of the March Events occurring 
between the first and second round of voting, 28 February to 12 March 2005; and the end, 
which articulates the protests that occurred after the second round of voting held on 13 
March, that lead to Akaev’s ouster on 24 March 2005.  The next section will apply social 
mobilization theory to the March Events.  The subsequent section analyzes the two case 
studies in terms of loss-aversion and risk-neutral peasant rebellion theory.  Finally, the 
last section looks at the March Events in the context of the Kyrgyzstani history. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Changing from Bicameral to Unicameral 
After the Aksy events, the Akaev administration was shaken. Despite the 
resignation of the second highest raking official in the country, the prime minister, 
political pressure was still being applied and Akaev’s resignation was still sought.37  In 
light of such pressure, the Akaev administration decided to hold a nation-wide 
referendum, on two separate issues; one, whether or not Akaev was to serve out his entire 
                                                 
37 “Opposition Congress Urges Effort to Force Akayev’s Resignation,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, 
August 14, 2002, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200208/0020.shtml (accessed 
June 15, 2007); Albion, “Kyrgyz Prime Minister.”  
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term; and secondly, proposed constitutional amendments.38  Of the proposed 
amendments, the most contentious was the conversion of the bi-cameral Parliament to a 
unicameral one, thereby reducing the number of parliamentary seats.39  While some 
presidential powers were to be granted to the Parliament, the maneuver was widely seen 
as an attempt by Akaev to weaken the legislature.40  
Following months of contentious deliberation, on 2 February 2003, Kyrgyzstanis 
went to the polls and in what were widely criticized elections, voted to affirm Akaev’s 
tenure and to reform Parliament into a unitary structure.41  While the serving 
parliamentarians would be allowed to complete their term, new elections were scheduled 
for the last Sunday of February of each election year with the next elections set for 2005.  
The implications for reduction in the amount of legislators were significant for both 
                                                 
38 “Kyrgyz President Sets Referendum Date,” Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, January 14, 2003, 
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Akaev and all serving parliamentarians, as those with ambitions of continuing in office 
were most likely to need to support and resources of the president.  For opposition 
parliamentarians, the reduction in seats was hugely significant as they had always been 
less organized and less resourced than the pro-government parliamentarians, with whom 
competition would be fierce for fewer seats.  Interestingly enough however, the death 
knell of the opposition never came.  In fact, opposition numbers suddenly swelled two 
years later during the pre-election period and after the first round of parliamentary 
elections on 27 February 2005 when many pro-government parliamentarians who had 
fallen out of favor with the Akaev administration were disqualified from the voting rolls, 
thereby joining the ranks of the opposition over night.42 
2. Otunbaeva 
The bellwether for the March Events began six weeks before the scheduled first 
round of parliamentary elections on 27 February 2005 when former Ambassador to the 
United Kingdom and United States, Roza Otunbaeva was denied an opportunity to run 
for office.  This incident, while not unanticipated, stands out for two reasons.  Her 
exclusion from the poll was an exemplar for a situation that occurred across the republic 
in the week prior to the February election and forced many would-be candidates to 
mobilize in reaction.  Secondly, Otunbaeva’s case eerily echoed that of Kulov.  Like, 
Kulov, Otunbaeva represented not just the opposition but an opposition figure that had 
served in a prestigious position for the Akaev regime, yet who had also fallen out of favor 
and was denied the opportunity to contend for power through institutional levers.  While 
the Otunbaeva affair was not unique in that three other former Ambassadors were also 
denied a chance to contend for a parliamentary seat, Otunbaeva was the most high-profile  
 
 
                                                 
42 Muratbek Imanaliev, “Comment: Kyrgyz Ballot to Sow Seeds for Future,” Institute for War and 
Peace Reporting, February 23, 2005, 
http://iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=238635&apc_state=henirca6cd0b917b3e225e2048380e68c371c36 
(accessed June 15, 2007); Ainagul Abdrakhmanova, “Kyrgyz Election Protests Spread,” Institute for War 
and Peace Reporting, February 24, 2005, 
http://iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=238616&apc_state=henircaf687e3ab7a4d9b18017a1eb89a69b5ea (accessed 
June 15, 2007).  
 26
candidate to be denied and the means by which the Akaev administration denied her 
candidacy served to reinforce the frame of Akaev as a corrupt leader, heading a corrupt 
institution. 
Otunbaeva, who wanted to contend for a Bishkek district seat, had taken the 
necessary procedural steps to do so, and was actually awarded the opportunity by the 
district election commission on 6 January 2005; however, within hours of approving of 
Otunbaeva’s registration, the same commission rescinded approval and denied her the 
opportunity to run, citing a “lack of a quorum” at the time of approval as the reason for 
rescinding the registration, despite evidence to the contrary.43  Complicating the district 
election commission’s position was the fact that according to Kyrgyzstani Election Code 
any possible overruling of a district election commission action was only the purview of a 
court or a higher election commission body.  Recognizing this inherent contradiction, the 
district election commission attempted to justify the action by invoking a recently enacted 
provision of Kyrgyzstani Election Code that stipulated only citizens residing in 
Kyrgyzstan for the previous five years could run for public office, a law that extended to 
diplomats well.  As with Kulov, Otunbaeva appealed the decision all the way up 
bureaucratic ladder to the Constitutional Court, and was rejected on the grounds that she 
had not met the residency requirements.  At that point, Otunbaeva’s story broke from 
Kulov’s in that Kulov was arrested on false charges and eventually imprisoned, whereas, 
after the first round of voting in the parliamentary elections, Otunbaeva was the victim of 
violence when a grenade was thrown at her apartment exploding on the balcony.44  While 
no one was hurt, the intent of the grenade was clear; Otunbaeva was not a welcome figure 
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in domestic politics, just as with Kulov.  Unfortunately for Akaev, such actions only 
served to galvanize the loosely affiliated opposition politicians across the country. 
3. The Run-up: The Week Before the Election 
The reality of the March Events is that the effective rural mobilization that 
brought down the Akaev regime on 24 March began in earnest across the country in the 
week prior to the parliamentary elections of 27 February, when, in similar fashion to 
Otunbaeva, a slew of candidates were disqualified from the election rolls.45  During the 
course of the next week, in four of Kyrgyzstan’s seven provinces, protestors began to 
block roads, seize government buildings, demand the resignation of local officials, and 
refused to disperse until grievances were addressed, all before a single ballot was cast.  In 
recognition of such actions, Akaev, through governmental institutions, attempted to quell 
the situation, but rather than accept compromise the disparate protestors continued to 
demonstrate.  In the Tong region, within the span of three days, supporters of Arslanbek 
Maliev, one of the disqualified opposition politicians, took to the streets, seized the local 
government building, demanded the reinstatement of Maliev, forced the first round of 
elections to be put off until 13 March—the scheduled day for second round voting—and 
forced the resignation of the head Region official—an act taken by Akaev, himself.46  
The timing and length of this incident are important in that the initial protests began on 
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23 February and by 26 February, the day before the first round of elections, Akaev had 
already conceded to one of the protestors’ demands, the removal of the head Region 
official in Tong.  While Akaev was presumably attempting to quell the larger threat of a 
“colored revolution” against his regime, he unwittingly fed the opposition more 
confidence as similar protests that had begun at the same time as the Tong events, 
continued and gained strength; in Tuip, Issky-Kul the district election commission 
reinstated the candidacy of Sadyr Japarov after protestors blocked the main highway of 
Issyk-Kul Oblast; in Jalalabad 400 protestors gathered in opposition to the exclusion of 
former prime minister, Kurmanbek Bakiev; in Kochkor, Naryn the thousands of 
protestors supporting three disqualified opposition candidates, Akylbek Japarov, 
Beishenbek Bolotbekov and Kurmanbek Baiterekov, agreed to end their protests and vote 
“against all” in the first round in order to force a second round of voting; in Bakai-Ata, 
Talas 1,300 protestors mobilized to force the reinstatement of Ravshan Jenebekov.47   
4. Round 1: Between the First and Second Round of Voting 
Rather than relieve Akaev of political pressure, the first round of voting simply 
gave ground to expanded protest.  During the pre-election period, only supporters of 
disqualified parliamentary candidates rallied to protest, yet after the first round of 
elections, this group was joined by supporters of candidates who either lost the first round 
or did not qualify for the second round of voting.  In turn, the period in between the first 
and second round of voting saw protest erupt across the country, with the vast majority 
occurring in southern Kyrgyzstan, far away from the Akaev powerbase in Bishkek.  In 
addition to the pre-election locations, protests began in Osh, Aaravan, Kara-Suu, Uzgen, 
Batken, Kara-Kulja, At-Bashi, Nooken, and the Ottuk and Kyzyl-Tuu regions of Naryn.  
As with the pre-election protests, the post-round one incidents were initially motivated by 
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local constituents arguing on behalf of a local candidate barred from the election.48  This 
is significant in that the protestors were picketing on behalf of a local patron and that the 
focus of concern was with the eligibility of each candidate.  That is to say, all the protest 
actions of the pre and post-round one period began as disagreements over the 
implementation of local elections, for which a local remedy was necessary.  The local 
focus remained in tact throughout the republic until 4 March, when the protestors in 
Jalalabad called on Akaev to step down from the presidency, a maneuver interestingly 
enough made by the protestors, not their candidate or a representative of any opposition 
party.49  Not until two days later on 6 March, with protestors occupying the 
administrative building in Jalalabad, did the former prime minister and opposition 
politician, Kurmanbek Bakiev join the Jalalabad protestors in calling for Akaev’s 
resignation in addition to the previously stipulated demands, a move that changed the 
face of the protests.50  With Bakiev, the first major politician to publicly side with the 
protestors in his own constituency, at least one of the many seemingly natural and 
unconnected protest events besieging the country was given a newly political face, a 
move that would prove critical for both Bakiev and the larger cause.  Shortly thereafter, 
many of the traditional opposition politicians began to take on a more visible role with 
Bakiev functioning as the de facto leader. 
The week prior to the second round of elections saw an open dialogue between 
the leaders of the opposition and the Akaev administration.  On 6 March Bakiev called 
for an emergency session of Parliament to decide if preterm presidential elections were 
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necessary to calm the situation in the country.51  The very next day in Bishkek, 
Otunbaeva echoed the same call but added that the outgoing Parliament should be 
reinstated to solve the country’s crisis.52  For the Akaev administration’s part, the week 
before the second round saw a flurry of activity beginning with Prime Minister Nikolai 
Tanaev telling the press that, “The organizers of these actions will be brought to account 
and we will not slip (sic) a single case of violation of the laws of this country.”53  On 10 
March Akaev made his first statement since the first round of elections in which he 
attempted to resurrect the frame of corrupt officials for protestors.54  To close out the 
week, presidential spokesman Abdil Segizbaev on 11 March challenged the protestors 
with the possibility of holding yet another referendum on whether or not Akaev should 
serve for another term.55 
5. The End: After the Second Round until Akaev’s Ouster 
Where the results of the first round widened the movement against Akaev, the 
results of the second round served to entrench anti-Akaev interests.  With the 
announcement of only five parliamentary seats going to the opposition out of the seventy-
five available, anti-Akaev interests looked at the second-round elections as 
confirmation.56  While the Akaev administration looked towards the second-round of 
elections as the balm necessary for the country to return to normalcy, the opposition 
movement treated the 13 March run-off elections as yet another step in the long process 
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of seeking Akaev’s resignation.57  This fundamental difference would prove to be crucial 
as the actions of the Akaev administration in the ensuing days would demonstrate.   
On 15 March, after the second round of voting, the protestors of Jalalabad held a 
people’s council, kuraltai, at which time the resignation of Akaev was agreed to by all 
present, a number rumored to be between 5,000 and 15,000.58  Although the protestors 
failed to agree on a presidential candidate in Jalalabad, they remained united and 
continued to occupy the grounds of the administrative provincial administration 
building—a building which the protesters held since 4 March—revealing how 
comfortable the opposition felt in threatening Akaev’s power.  Moreover, only three days 
later on 18 March, the protesters of Osh met with little resistance when they took the Osh 
provincial building and the next day held a another kuraltai deciding upon a chairman of 
the people’s council, establishing a policing force, and maintaining the refrain of Akaev’s 
resignation.59  The establishment of a dual-government threatened Akaev’s 
administration to the point that in the early morning of 20 March, Special Forces arrived 
in Jalalabad and Osh to take back the two administrative buildings.  This maneuver 
represented a major turning point in the back and forth between the opposition and the 
Presidency, as Akaev had as yet resorted to non-violent measures of negotiation for fear 
of inciting another Aksy-type event.60  While the security forces met with initial success 
                                                 
57 “Kyrgyz President Appeals for Calm,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 15, 2005, 
http://rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/3/37C95330-ECFB-4415-9E88-222CD7164A86.html (accessed June 
15, 2007); Gulnoza Saidazimova, “Kyrgyzstan: Fragmented Opposition Ponders Next Move After Election 
Defeat,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 15, 2005, 
http://rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/3/99CC33BE-59DA-46DE-852F-7F2A59DD019B.html (accessed June 
15, 2007).  
58 Leila Saralaeva, Bakyt Orunbekov, Ainagul Abdrakhmanova, and Sultan Jumagulov, “Kyrgyz 
Opposition Fights On,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, March 16, 2, 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=238784&apc_state=henirca8888a66ad6a6e09e5b2a383fb81a9d47 
(accessed June 15, 2007).  
59 Alisher Saipov, Sultan Jumagulov, Leila Saralaeva, and Ainagul Abdrakhmanova, “Anti-
Government Protests Solidify in South,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, March 18, 2005, 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=238771&apc_state=henirca6c0818e609e41d580d9761e5fa02f498 
(accessed June 15, 2007); “Demonstrators Occupy Provincial Office in Kyrgyzstan,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, March 18, 2005, http://rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/3/ED3AC95F-CB26-4C55-
9575-F5567AA30259.html (accessed June 15, 2007); “Kyrgyz Opposition Holds People’s Congress in 
Osh,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 19, 2005, http://rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/3/49A18B44-
2BE2-466A-83A9-C87B35C56A2E.html (accessed June 15, 2007).  
60 Saipov, et al., “Anti-Government Protests.”  
 32
in retaking the administrative buildings, the success was short lived.  Within hours, the 
very same administrative building in Jalalabad and the police station, which housed as the 
displaced governor and police chief, came under siege from protestors.  Shortly thereafter 
the administrative building was retaken, and the police station was burnt to the ground 
after the authorities surrendered to the protestors.  Less than a day had passed before the 
same fate befell the Osh administration building on 21 March, with the protestors 
retaking the building while the security forces were attending a Nooruz (vernal equinox 
holiday) celebration.  Moreover, the protestors occupied the airports of both Jalalabad 
and Osh, in an attempt to disallow the return of the Special Forces sent from Bishkek or a 
re-supply of new forces.  Although these two incidents garnered the most attention from 
the Akaev administration, the fact remained that opposition forces had taken 
administrative buildings throughout the country, not just in the southern cities.  Indeed, 
the southern rural regional offices were taken over along with the regional offices in 
Batken, Talas, Naryn, and Issyk-Kul provinces, leaving just Chui Province, home to the 
capital Bishkek, as the remaining power base for Akaev.   
In his biggest admission yet, Akaev on 22 March called for an investigation into 
the instances of election outcomes that caused “social unrest,” but this gesture was a poor 
acknowledgement of a situation already beyond his control as rural protestors had 
descended upon the capitol to join the few Bishkek protestors on 23 March.61  Less a day 
later on 24 March, after a single day of protests that were met with police resistance, the 
protestors returned reinvigorated and stormed the White House, forcing Akaev to flee to 
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Russia with his family and signaling the end of an era in Kyrgyzstani politics.62  While 
the next twenty-four hours would see major looting across the capitol as a result of a 
power vacuum, not all the fallout from Akaev’s departure would be destructive as Feliks 
Kulov would be freed from a Bishkek jail after spending four years as political prisoner 
of the Akaev administration.63 
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED 
1. Frame Alignment  
To say that the March Events was the outcome of a frame competition between 
Akaev and the opposition is to state the obvious and miss the real substance of the 
situation.  As with the Kara-Buura and Aksy incidents Akaev controlled virtually all 
means of institutional power necessary to create the frame of his choice and then force 
that frame on the country.  In the weeks leading up to the March Events, however, 
Akaev’s vast resources and the perceived abuse of those resources (candidate 
disqualification, preferential treatment of select candidates and the eventual rigging of 
elections) actually hurt the president and gave the opposition the frame behind which 
support could be mustered.  As was evident from the pre-election protests, discontent 
with the election system was rife throughout the country, which meant that the opposition 
frame of Akaev as an abuser of power had fertile ground upon which to resonate, but the 
opposition’s ability to capitalize on such discontent by transferring local dissatisfaction to 
the national level was still missing.  Without the need to worry about crafting a new 
frame, the opposition simply needed to align their frame with the local protestors, which 
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necessitated unification amongst the traditional opposition groups and with the newly 
disenfranchised “opposition” protests that had developed across Kyrgyzstan.   
Prior to the pre-election period of the March Events, the opposition was scattered 
over eighty different political parties in Kyrgyzstan, each with a unique cause and 
leader.64  Recognizing this fact, ten small opposition parties formed a coalition called the 
People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan, in September 2004, headed by Bakiev, in an attempt 
to bring the different opposition parties together.65  The previous five years worth of 
experience had revealed the opposition’s weakness; in the instances when factions of the 
opposition did unite behind a single cause, Kara-Buura and Aksy, the occurrences were 
primarily defined by issues of the local constituencies not broad enough to unite the 
entire Kyrgyzstani citizenry.  As with previous elections, the Akaev administrations used 
institutional power to select parliamentary candidates and exclude others, however, 
unique to the March Events was the disqualification of candidates from the election rolls 
who were previously considered pro-government.  In so doing, the Akaev administration 
expanded the opposition force to a greater extent than previously seen in Kyrgyzstani 
political history.  Whereas in the fall of 2004, the opposition was a small group of 
political elites removed from power, by the time of the elections of 2005, the opposition 
had grown to include the traditional opposition candidates and all candidates disqualified 
from running for Parliament.  While Akaev tried to stay above the fray throughout the 
protests, issuing only a couple of statements addressed at the lawlessness of the 
demonstrations, the reality was that his political capital was already spent, as he was seen 
to embody a corrupt regime that was, to his detriment, creating new oppositionists every 
day.  Ironically, the new oppositionist figures could not have survived without the Akaev 
regime, as Akaev proved the necessary foil behind which each opposition leader rallied 
his supporters. 
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2. Frame Resonance 
The importance of Otunbaeva’s experience lies not with her, as the victim, but 
with Akaev as the perceived organizer of the affair and the resulting abuse of power.  
Otunbaeva’s fate in joining her fellow former ambassadors as a rejected parliamentary 
candidate revealed the lengths to which Akaev was willing to go in order to maintain his 
control.66  From the illegal mechanism by which her registration was revoked, the district 
election commission, to the timing of the revocation, only hours after her registration was 
awarded, and including the reasoning, lack of a quorum at the time of awarding the 
registration, Akaev “showed himself,” as the Kyrgyz say, as willing to use whatever 
power necessary to maintain tight political control over would-be parliamentarians.  This 
fact was only reaffirmed by Akaev’s refusal to sign legislation allowing Otunbaeva and 
three other former ambassadors to compete in the parliamentary elections, despite 
passage in the legislature prior to the poll.67  For the nascent opposition, the decision to 
bar the former diplomats in January 2005 helped to spark the frame that would come to 
dominate the March Events: 
After assessing the current situation, we decided to start collecting 
signatures on 1 February, from the whole of Kyrgyzstan, from both the 
south and north, from villages and towns, demanding that Akaev resign 
from power immediately! “Is that right, fellow countrymen?" Turgunaliev 
[opposition leader] asked.  Protesters answered: "Yes, that is right! Akaev, 
go away!"68 (emphasis added) 
Although this refrain was repeated throughout the March Events, the fact remains 
that until the traditional opposition forces wedded their frame to the power of the newly 
formed opposition protests, discontent primarily remained at the local, not national 
administration.  Moreover, the Tong, Kochkor, Talas, and Tuip protestors, the original 
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pre-election locations of protest, only demanded reinstatement of their candidate and, if 
necessary, nullification of any previous voting.  Jalalabad was the notable exception to 
this group of original pre-election protestors, as the people there began calling for Akaev 
to resign as early as 4 March.  In voicing displeasure with candidate disqualification, the 
majority of protestors took their discontent to the respective local administrations, not to 
the capital, Bishkek.  However, to the great benefit of the traditional oppositionists, 
discontent with the local administration was portable to the national level which dictated 
that the previously crafted frame of “Akaev go away,” needed not to be refined, but only 
to resonate in the places were protest was strongest.  This feat was accomplished after the 
second round of voting, when expanded protest events took root in regional power 
centers, and joined forces with the traditional opposition politicians.  As has been 
documented above, the protests shared common ground for grievance, but not any 
common direction until after the second round of voting, when the first people’s council 
was held in Jalalabad on 15 March, then a second in Osh on 19 March.69  What emerged 
from both of those meetings was the connection of the traditional opposition’s pre-
election frame of “Akaev go away!” with the strength of the newly formed opposition 
protestors in control of the major southern cities.  When Akaev sent Special Forces to 
take back the administrative buildings on 20 March, the violence that erupted and the 
resultant re-taking of the building by the protestors only further cemented the idea that 
the only acceptable solution to the situation was the resignation of Akaev.70   
3. Cultural Repertoire of Redress 
The success of the March Events is directly attributable to the expansion of 
protest to rural areas.  Mirroring the constituencies and methodologies of the Kara-Buura 
and Aksy groups, the majority of protestors of the March Events were rural peasants who 
employed the same cultural repertoire as their predecessors in 2000 and 2002, but on a 
wider scale.  Unlike the Aksy constituency, the protestors of the March Events did not 
invent and use new techniques; rather the March Events simply expanded the locations of 
                                                 
69 Saralaeva, Orunbekov, Abdrakhmanova, and Jumagulov, “Kyrgyz Opposition Fights”; Saipov, 
Jumagulov, Saralaeva, and Abdrakhmanova, “Anti-Government Protests.”  
70 Soros Foundation Kyrgyzstan, 10-22. 
 37
where the techniques of redress were to be utilized.  Table 1 comprises not just the 
methodologies used by the Kara-Buura and Aksy constituencies, but also the tactics used 
by the protestors throughout Kyrgyzstan during the March Events, with the notable 
exception of Bishkek.  While the capital was not without protests, primarily by 
Otunbaeva supporters, these protests were relatively small in number and tame in 
comparison to the events throughout the rest of the country.  Moreover, once the cultural 
repertoire of the Bishkek protestors was expanded to include other forms of redress 
besides rallying, the Akaev regime collapsed within a matter of days, an outcome 
dependent as much on the cultural repertoire as the validation of such techniques 
occurring throughout the country in the weeks prior to 24 March.   
Comparing the events of the capital with those of the rural areas prior to the 24 
March ouster of Akaev reveals a cultural repertoire reliant on relative perspective.  While 
Otunbaeva and others were able to mobilize supporters in Bishkek, these events barely 
gave Akaev pause for concern, whereas protests in the rural regions, of the same size and 
concerned with the same issues proved daunting.  Beginning in January, over seven 
weeks before the scheduled elections, Bishkek protestors managed to hold rallies and 
picket the authorities, due to the disqualification of their candidate, yet these rallies 
proved largely ineffective.  Never able to muster more than 500 people at any one rally, 
the number of Bishkek protestors proved just as limiting as the cultural repertoire 
employed, picketing the local administration buildings and holding rallies to decry 
Akaev.71  The Bishkek protestors garnered little local support and ultimately decided to 
halt protest in the beginning of February after almost a month of action, yet without the 
reinstatement of Otunbaeva.72  By contrast, the protests of rural Tuip, Tong, and Bakai-
Ata villages, met with almost immediate success.  In both the Tuip and Bakai-Ata 
regions, previously disqualified candidates were allowed to run after supporters staged 
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protests and blocked roads.73  In Tong, Maliev’s supporters forced Akaev to intervene 
and remove the head of the local administration after they seized the local administration 
building.  While the same success was not forthcoming in Kochkor, the protestors did 
manage to control the situation through a blockade of the Bishkek-Toragut road and as 
they agreed to vote “against all” forcing a delay in the initial round of voting.  Moreover, 
the blockade of the Bishkek-Osh road, and the marches of rural peasants to the regional 
centers of Jalalabad and Osh in order to stage massive protests, along with the holding of 
kuraltais to establish a separate governing power, were the techniques of redress 
available to the rural protestors that continued from the Aksy events and revealed the 
limits of Akaev’s power outside of Bishkek.  In fact, Akaev’s tenuous hold on power was 
finally squashed when his Special Forces were set against the cultural repertoire of the 
rural protestors in Jalalabad and Osh on 20 and 21 March, respectively.  By taking, then 
losing the administrative buildings, Akaev’s trump card that had worked in Kara-Buura 
in 2000 failed miserably.  Making matters worse, the decision by the local security forces 
to side with the local protestors, signaled the true victory of the cultural repertoire 
employed by the rural protestors, who, armed with fresh victories marched on Bishkek.74  
By capitulating to the opposition in Kyrgyzstan’s second and third largest cities, the 
security forces not only validated the cultural repertoire of the protestors, but gave the 
opposition the necessary momentum to levy the threat of employing similar techniques 
against the security forces and government in Bishkek.  Indeed the cultural repertoire of 
the rural protestors succeeded in the capital on 24 March due to the momentum and 
effectiveness of the entire March Events. 
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D. PEASANT REBELLION THEORY 
While not all of the protests that occurred over the entire time period of the March 
Events were fostered by and primarily composed of peasants, the protest events which 
began and sustained the momentum of the March Events were fundamentally peasant-
driven.  Even in the southern cities of Jalalabad and Osh, where the southern protest took 
on greatest attention, the composition of those occupying the administration buildings, 
holding rallies, and conducting the kuraltais were mostly rural peasants.75  These protests 
took on a significant importance in the history of the March Events, as they beget similar 
protests around the country, which ultimately brought down Akaev.   
When understood in the context of the parliamentary conversion from bi-cameral 
to unicameral, the March Events were protests motivated by a loss-averse peasantry 
seeking to prevent the loss of political power and acceptant of the risks involved.  As 
outlined above, the initial locations of protest, outside of Bishkek, were all in rural 
constituencies where a traditional pro-government candidate had fallen out with the 
Akaev administration and was disqualified from the election rolls in the weeks prior to 
round one voting.  By disqualifying these candidates, while promoting others, Akaev was 
essentially attempting to take away political power from not just the local politician but 
his rural constituency as well.  In other words, the rural constituencies of the disqualified 
politicians took action against the potential loss of political power, advocating only for 
that which maintained the status quo.  Taking on the state's decision in Kyrgyzstan was 
an inherently risky proposition, but by initially focusing on local election commissions, 
the peasantry did not set out to change the status quo.  Had candidates not been 
disqualified, any ensuing protests could be considered risk-neutral as evidence of 
peasants seeking gains; however, protest did not erupt prior to candidate disqualification, 
suggesting that the loss of the status quo or potential loss of political power is what 
actually drove the peasantry to rally on behalf of their candidate.   
In attempting to explicate the evolution of events, one cannot exclude the 
possibility of the peasantry adopting a risk-neutral stance intermittently; however in the 
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overall history of the March Events, the actions of the protestors suggest that any ground 
gained from risk-neutral action came to be seen as the status quo, which the peasantry 
was reluctant to relinquish.  For example, the taking of the administrative buildings and 
blockading of roads throughout the country required ignoring the potential consequences 
involved in such behavior, a risk-neutral perspective, yet after a period of time, the 
occupation of the administrative buildings and the control over the various roads by the 
peasant protestors came to be seen as the status quo, or in social mobilization 
terminology, normalized.  Thus, the reaction of the peasant protestors to re-take the 
administration buildings in Jalalabad and Osh after the Special Forces raids was action 
motivated by a peasantry refusing to relinquish that which they already possessed. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The manner in which the March Events played out revealed the extent to which 
Kyrgyzstan of 2005 was a rural country.  Moving from the periphery to the center, the 
movement was able to slowly gain sufficient momentum that when married to the support 
already available in Bishkek proved too daunting for Akaev.  Lacking tantamount 
resources, the traditional opposition and the new opposition had to take advantage of that 
which was available; primary among these options was manipulation of Akaev’s own 
actions.  Through his own hubris Akaev allowed the opposition to out maneuver him in 
the battle of frame resonance by capitalizing on the decisions of the local election 
apparatus and easily linking those decisions with the president.  Further, Akaev 
underestimated the implications of parliamentary conversion, a transformation that was 
not lost on the candidates, but yet which pro-presidential parties took for granted.  In his 
attempt to hand-pick the would-be parliamentarians from the available cadre, Akaev 
underestimated the consequences of taking away political power from those grown 
accustomed to such privilege.  The marriage of the new opposition with the traditional 
opposition is ultimately the event that undid Akaev as the protestors concentrated not on 
how to mobilize, but on how to meet with success. 
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IV. PROTEST IN POST-AKAEV KYRGYZSTAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the two largest social-mobilization efforts in the post-
Akaev era, the Akmatbaev affair and the on-going struggle of the opposition movement.  
The next section gives the necessary background on both cases, which span multiple 
months.  Whereas the Akmatbaev affair began and concluded in a seven-month time 
period, the opposition's struggle to enact their political reforms has yet to cease, however, 
for the purposes of this thesis, the case study of the opposition will span a single year's 
worth of protest from April 2006 to April 2007.  In the third section, the events are 
analyzed according to social mobilization theory.  For the fourth section, peasant 
rebellion theory in terms of loss-aversion and risk-neutrality is applied to both case 
studies.  Finally, the concluding section reviews the two cases in light of post-Akaev era 
protest. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. The Akmatbaev Affair 
a. Round One 
Only months after taking office as the first prime minister in post-Akaev 
Kyrgyzstan, Feliks Kulov faced not just calls for his resignation, but accusations of 
conspiracy to murder.76  On 20 October 2005, the death of parliamentarian Tynchbek 
Akmatbaev at the hands of prisoners in the very same prison where Kulov was held 
during the Akaev era sparked a furor and protest not seen in Kyrgyzstan since the March 
Events.  Just as the details of Akmatbaev's death remain controversial in Kyrgyzstan, so 
does Kulov's role in the affair.  The indisputable facts are: one, Akmatbaev, as chairman 
of the Kyrgyz parliament's committee for legal affairs, defense and law and order, 
traveled to the prison to quell the prisoner uprising; two, Kulov traveled to the 
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Moldavanovka prison as well on 20 October 2005; and three, while at the prison, Kulov 
negotiated the release of the bodies of those killed.  Two days later, the parliamentarian's 
death caused 500 protestors to descend on Bishkek from Akmatbaev's constituency in the 
Issyk-Kul region to demand Kulov's resignation, accusing him of murder.77  Protestor 
reasoning was based upon rumors of criminal connections between a supposed Kulov 
associate and Akmatbaev's brother Rysbek.  During the Akaev era, Kulov was 
imprisoned at the Moldavanovka prison, where another infamous inmate was housed, 
Aziz Batukaev, an ethnic Chechen and reputed crime boss, who had accused Rysbek 
Akmatbaev of murder.78  Also, during the Akaev era, Rysbek Akmatbaev, a reputed 
crime-boss himself, lived on the lam owing to pending murder charges against him, only 
returning to Kyrgyzstan in May of 2005.79  For Tynchbek Akmatbaev's constituents, 
Kulov's imprisonment with Batukaev was sufficient enough reason to make the 
accusation that Kulov arranged for Akmatbaev's murder, necessitating removal from the 
post of prime minister.80   
Although the protests continued for only six days, short by the standards 
of the March Events, procedurally they represented a new path for the both parties 
involved.  Deputy Interior Minister Alymbai Sultanov, accused of wrongdoing by the 
Bishkek protestors, was sacked by Kulov on 24 October, the third day of protests.81  Only 
one day later, Parliamentary Speaker Tekebaev met with Rysbek Akmatbaev and 
announced the creation of a seven-member parliamentary commission to investigate 
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Tynchbek Akmatbaev's death.  Concurrently, Kulov supporters held counter-
demonstrations, reaching a peak of 1,500 demonstrators, to demand an end to criminality 
in the halls of power.82  Finally, on the six day of demonstrations, 27 October 2005, 
President Bakiev agreed to meet with a delegation of Akmatbaev's supporters and 
negotiated an end to the protests pending the results of the parliamentary commission.83 
b. Round Two 
Separated by months, but connected by the same center of gravity, the 
second chapter of the Akmatbaev affair began on 7 February 2006, when Rysbek 
Akmatbaev registered to run in the by-election for his brother's vacated parliamentary 
seat.84  By registering, Akmatbaev caused a legal crisis that again fostered pro-
Akmatbaev protestors to gather in Bishkek.  After reversing the initial decision granting 
him the right to run, the Central Election Commission barred Akmatbaev from running 
owing to the fact that he had not lived in Kyrgyzstan continuously for the previous five 
years, a fact supplied by the prime minister's office and a Bishkek nongovernmental 
organization (NGO), the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society.85  In response to the 
disqualification, Akmatbaev supporters took to the streets of Balykchy, the open 
constituency, blocking the roads and halting traffic on 30 March 2006.86  A day later, 
1,000 Akmatbaev supporters gathered in front of the White House in Bishkek demanding 
the reinstatement of Akmatbaev and the removal of Kulov from the post of prime 
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minister.87  With tensions rising, President Bakiev exited the White House and addressed 
the protestors asking that they disperse and await the decision of the courts, a requested 
granted the president.88  On 3 April 2006, a Bishkek district court reinstated Akmatbaev's 
candidacy, allowing him to run, a decision later confirmed by the Supreme Court.89  In 
response to the reinstatement, the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society staged a 
rally on the day prior to the by-election of 9 April in which 2,000 marched for a 
Kyrgyzstan “free from criminals.”90  The next day as expected Rysbek Akmatbaev won 
the Balykchy by-election, however, like his candidacy, Rysbek Akmatbaev’s 
parliamentary status caused yet another legal crisis.  Parliamentarians are not subject to 
court investigation, yet Akmatbaev's case was still technically open awaiting appeal, 
placing him in a true legal limbo until such a time as the issue was adjudicated.  As such, 
Akmatbaev could neither appear in court as a parliamentarian, nor take his seat while his 
case was still open. 
c. Round Three 
Slightly over a month from the by-election, with the Central Election 
Commission still undecided, Rysbek Akmatbaev was gunned down and killed leaving a 
mosque in the village of Kokzhar on 10 May 2006.  Protests erupted two days later in 
Balykchy where constituents blocked roads and accused Kulov of the murder and 
demanding an investigation.  Despite initially refusing to meet with Akmatbaev's 
supporters, President Bakiev agreed to meet with representatives of the protestors on 16 
                                                 
87 “Some 1,000 Protest in Bishkek,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 31, 2006, 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/3/5ECDB596-E82D-484A-927C-125ECA984407.html (accessed 
June 15, 2007); “Supporters of Would-Be Kyrgyz Parliamentary Candidate Protest in Bishkek...,” 
Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, April 3, 2006, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200604/0000.shtml (accessed June 15, 2007).  
88 Saralaeva, “Tense Stand-off”; “Demonstration in Bishkek Ends.”  
89 Leila Saralaeva and Gulnura Toralieva, “Kyrgyz Premier Orders Mafia Clampdown,” Institute for 
War and Peace Reporting, April 14, 2006, 
http://iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=261093&apc_state=henirca460fd112e87a390cb39f1ae85e2c9c2b (accessed 
June 15, 2007).  
90 “Kyrgyz Demonstrators Call for Law and Order,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 8, 2006, 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/4/24EDFADD-58E2-44C4-B035-3D3CECA58618.html 
(accessed June 15, 2007); Saralaeva and Toralieva, “Kyrgyz Premier.” 
 45
May in an attempt to quell the unrest that had descended upon the Issyk-Kul region.91  
While the exact details of the meeting between Bakiev and Akmatbaev's supporters 
remains unknown, upon return to Issyk-Kul, Akmatbaev's representatives publicly urged 
the protestors to halt the road blockade and protests.92  Despite the earlier calls for 
Kulov's resignation and an investigation into Akmatbaev's death, the 16 May meeting 
was the last public confrontation between the state and Akmatbaev's supporters signaling 
the end of the Akmatbaev affair. 
2. The Opposition's Struggle 
The year of intermittent opposition protests between April 2006 and April 2007 
revealed an opposition movement organizing in a new location, beholden to a less 
aggressive methodology of redress, and with a different composition of actors.  Decrying 
Bakiev for broken campaign promises—primarily constitutional reform—the opposition 
began their struggle where the March Events left off, with an April 2006 single-day rally 
in Bishkek.  One year later however, in April 2007, the opposition found itself in no less 
the same position as the year previous, protesting unfulfilled promises, but with new 
leadership and the recipient of a violent government crackdown after a multi-day protest 
event.  With leadership born out of the Akaev era, but reinvigorated by more recent 
fallout with Bakiev, and armed with the memory of the March Events, the opposition set 
out upon a path of urban protest directed at frustration with the presidential 
administration.  Transplanted to the capital, Bishkek, the opposition shed the periphery to 
center paradigm of the March Events for a center-focused approach.  Led by members of 
parliament such as Tekebaev, Beknazarov, Melis Eshimkanov, former Foreign Minister 
Otunbaeva, and the leader of the Social Democratic Party Almaz Atambaev, amongst 
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others, the opposition leadership was not short of experience, however, such experience 
would not translate into action until the third opposition protest of 2006 in November and 
the first of 2007 in April.93 
a. November 2006 
Where the April and May single-day protests lacked equivalent numbers 
of protestors and failed to produce substantive changes to the Kyrgyzstani constitution, 
the November protests were the most heavily attended since the March Events and 
fostered the kind of major constitutional changes always desired by the opposition.  In an 
attempt to head off major clashes, President Bakiev met with opposition leaders on 31 
October promising to submit a draft constitution to Parliament on 2 November that 
conceded many opposition demands, however Bakiev failed to meet the deadline by four 
days submitting his proposal on 6 November.94  In the interim, the opposition launched 
the planned protests on 2 November as both Bakiev and Prime Minister Kulov accused 
the opposition of plotting a coup.95  Despite the accusation and Bakiev’s broken 
promises, the first day of protests saw more than 15,000 people rally in support of the 
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opposition calling for a new constitution.96  Angered at Bakiev, the opposition expanded 
upon their platform by marching to the Bishkek Mayor’s office and the state run media 
station in an effort to draw sympathy and air time, respectively, while awaiting Bakiev’s 
proposed constitution.97  When Bakiev did submit his proposed constitution on 6 
November, he did so without the promised reforms of 31 October, a move that sparked 
opposition fury and even greater protestor participation.98  Smarting from Bakiev’s 
proposal, forty-five parliamentarians, lacking the requisite fifty-one for a quorum, in the 
early hours of 7 November created a body called the “Constituent Assembly” and drafted 
a separate constitution significantly curtailing presidential powers, all the while as 
protestors remained in the central square.99  Infuriated, Bakiev accused the 
parliamentarians of attempting to “usurp power,” but realizing the power of the 
opposition’s supporters—rumored in the tens of thousands and convened outside the 
White House—he called on the opposition to negotiate with his representatives on a 
compromise constitution.100  Despite the overture, rising tensions between the two parties 
spilled over into the street in the form of a clash between pro-presidential and opposition 
groups, with the former considerably smaller than the latter, necessitating police 
intervention to prevent further injury.101  As tensions hit a peak on the afternoon of 7 
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November, both parties announced that they had reached a tentative agreement on a new 
constitution thereby diffusing the potential for massive clashes between the security 
forces and the protestors and only two days later, the constitution became law.102  While 
the process of creating a weaker executive in the constitution was the prime demand of 
the opposition, the ensuing legal state of affairs unleashed upon Kyrgyzstan created an 
unanticipated constitutional crisis. 
b. April 2007 
In what can only be described as a Kyrgyzstani turn of events, the April 
2007 opposition protests were precipitated and led by the same person, Feliks Kulov.  
Slightly more than a month after airing his concerns over the constitutional reform 
process, Feliks Kulov resigned as prime minister, forcing a constitutional crisis.103  In 
short, the November 2006 constitution required government formation by a ruling 
parliamentary party of fifty percent or more, yet there was no ruling party, not to mention 
that the new constitution called for an expansion of parliament from seventy-five to 
ninety seats, which had yet to occur.  As such, Bakiev seized the opportunity to submit 
new amendments to the constitution that returned certain powers to the presidency, one of 
which was the power to form a government, and on 30 December 2006, Parliament 
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approved Kyrgyzstan’s third post-Akaev constitution.104  Upon adoption of the new 
constitution, Bakiev nominated Kulov for prime minister, however, Parliament rebuffed 
the submission and rejected Kulov’s candidacy, not once, but twice.105  Three weeks 
later, Feliks Kulov joined the opposition and began the process of calling for early 
presidential elections, which would eventually lead to the April 2007 protests.106    
Where the opposition was forced to wait until mid-way through the 
November 2006 protests for compromise from Bakiev, the April 2007 protests 
precipitated presidential compromise before the first rally.  On 30 March 2007, 
Parliament confirmed Bakiev’s nomination of a new prime minister, Almaz Atambaev, 
chosen from the opposition.107  Widely seen as a compromise gesture, Atamabev had 
been amongst the critics of the Bakiev administration at the November 2006 rallies, yet 
his confirmation was made without the widespread support of the opposition movement, 
which chose not to participate in government despite entreaties.108  Moreover, since 
Kulov’s joining of the opposition, the focus of demands changed from constitutional 
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amendments to early presidential elections, a call which Bakiev roundly rejected.109  
Nonetheless, the opposition continued applying pressure on Bakiev before the planned 
rallies of 11 April.110  As a sign of further compromise, Prime Minister Atambaev created 
a working group for constitutional reform, comprised of opposition politicians less than a 
week after taking office and a week from the first day of scheduled rallies.111  Despite 
these two gestures, the opposition held rallies across the country in the days prior to the 
scheduled 11 April mass rally in Bishkek, even as Bakiev accused the opposition of again 
plotting a coup.112   
The 11 April rallies were widely attended by the opposition and revealed 
the sophistication of the maturing opposition movement; however, at the end of the nine 
day rally the opposition met not with success but with persecution.  With over 10,000 
protestors rallying on the first day, the April 2007 protests appeared to be following the 
same path as the November 2006 rallies, yet in a departure from the previous year’s 
peaceful conclusions, the security services closed down the protests on 19 April.  Unlike 
the relatively peaceful protests of 2006, the last day of the April rallies saw a group of 
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2,000 supposedly opposition protestors sling stones at the White House, necessitating 
intervention on behalf of the security forces, and precipitating a further crackdown that 
evening, wiping out the opposition.113  Despite an average daily attendance of 4,000, 
peaceful marches to the state media outlets, and a call for debate on the dissolution of 
parliament, rumors persisted about the increasing levels of violence besieging the 
rallies.114  In the worst incident, a demonstrator who had returned to his home in Naryn 
province was found dead in a holding cell, after being detained by local authorities.115  
This served as the basis for pro-presidential MPs to stand against taking any action on 
constitutional reforms under the threat of violence from an allegedly unruly and 
undisciplined opposition.116  For the opposition’s part, the opposition leaders accused the 
authorities of persecution amidst post-rally detentions.117 
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED 
1. Frame Resonance 
a. The Akmatbaev Affair 
The Akmatbaev affair represented a notable step in the evolution of frame 
resonance in Kyrgyzstan not due to the actual frames, but due to how the frames were 
presented to the public.  Throughout the thrice initiated protests, Akmatbaev supporters 
were fundamentally advocating frames designed around individuals.  In the case of 
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Tynchbek Akmatbaev's death, the protestors' frame was crafted upon the involvement 
and personal history of Prime Minister Kulov.  During the second round of Akmatbaev 
protests, in which supporters advocated for the inclusion of Rysbek Akmatbaev in the by-
election poll, the demonstrators' frame centered again on Kulov as the organizer of the 
whole affair.118  In the last instance, the murder of Rysbek Akmatbaev brought an end to 
the entire affair, as the death of the individual leader resulted in the end of the larger 
cause.119   
The initial Akmatbaev frame of Kulov as the “killer” of Tynchbek 
Akmatbaev failed to resonate with an audience outside of Akmatbaev’s supporters owing 
to Kulov’s high esteem and the Akmatbaev brother’s shadowy past.  Less than two days 
after Tynchbek Akmatbaev's death, as the facts of the incident were still surfacing, 
Akmatbaev supporters took to the streets of Bishkek, labeling Kulov a “killer,” and 
calling for his resignation, a call that would last for six days until an end to the protests 
were negotiated by President Bakiev on 27 October.120  In attacking Kulov, the 
individual, the protestors attacked Kulov’s past, and created two major assumptions upon 
which their frame rested; firstly, Kulov was a true criminal who served time for a real 
reason; and secondly, while incarcerated, Kulov garnered personal ties with fellow 
criminals for future exploitation.121  Unfortunately for the Akmatbaev group, the veracity 
of these two pillars was so doubtful as to essentially undermine both the frame of Kulov 
and the Akmatbaev brother’s credibility.  Kulov's incarceration was widely seen as false 
and politically motivated by the Akaev administration which is why he was released from 
Moldavanovka prison on 24 March 2005, only hours after Akaev's flight to Russia.122  
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Further, the Akmatbaev frame attempted to negatively associate Kulov with the 
underworld, while exempting the Rysbek and Tynchbek of the same association.   
Undaunted by the facts, Rysbek Akmatbaev expanded his frame around 
individual culpability for his brother's death, “Besides Feliks [Kulov], there are some 
other people responsible [for his death] -- [parliamentary] speaker [Omurbek] Tekebaev 
and Deputy Interior Minister Alymbai Sultanov.”123  No where was the reaction to 
accusations of individual culpability more evident, than in the counter-protests staged by 
Kulov supporters, who laid the foundation for a reactionary frame targeting the larger 
issue of criminality within Kyrgyzstan.  Three days after the Akmatbaev protestors 
descended upon Bishkek, Kulov supporters and various NGOs organized a rally for 
“Kyrgyzstan Without Criminality.”124  Given that Tynchbek Akmatbaev's death was the 
third assassination of a parliamentarian since the March Events, Kulov's supporters 
decided to not address the specific incident, but the larger issue.125  With greater numbers 
and a different location, Kulov's supporters crafted a frame that both showed support for 
the prime minister and contempt with the overall criminal element inside Kyrgyzstan: 
“The people of Kyrgyzstan demand the imposition of order and an uncompromising 
battle with the criminal world, which will ensure [our] safety.”126  By creating a more 
general frame focused on an issue rather than an individual, and through appeal to a 
national, rather than local audience, Kulov was able to withstand the calls for his 
resignation despite the disciplined and vociferous Akmatbaev campaign.   
Months later, when Akmatbaev applied to run in the by-election, the 
opposing sides chose to slightly enhance their previous frames.  Kulov's original frame of 
criminality plaguing Kyrgyzstan proved to be not only apropos but coming to fruition.  
The controversy surrounding Rysbek Akmatbaev's registration involved not just his 
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criminal past, but allegations of death threats on government officials, and dubious 
dropping of charges against him in January 2006.  Moreover, Kulov’s frame was 
reinforced when an outspoken NGO organizer was attacked only days after coordinating 
a rally at which he advocated a Kyrgyzstan “free from criminals.”127 For Rysbek 
Akmatbaev, choosing to attack Kulov, as the prime minister, not as a criminal, garnered 
the most salient Akmatbaev frame to date.  This was especially so considering that the 
prime minister's office wrote to the Central Election Commission exposing Akmatbaev's 
residency issues, forcing the Central Election Commission to disqualify Akmatbaev and 
sparking the second round of protests.  Although, not illegal, the Akmatbaev camp 
framed the letter as an abuse of authority, while Kulov’s side focused the larger frame of 
criminality in Kyrgyzstan with Akmatbaev as the poster child for the problem.  
Ultimately, the competition of frames between Kulov and Akmatbaev did not end until 
the latter's death.  While the two frames drew inspiration from the opposing leader, they 
were never in competition for the same audience, as Akmatbaev concentrated on those in 
the halls of power, such as the president, and the courts, while Kulov’s supporters 
concentrated on framing an issue deserving of national public attention.   
b. The Opposition 
When Akaev fled Kyrgyzstan he concurrently met the opposition’s 
demands and presented the opposition with its first political challenge of the post-Akaev 
era, the challenge of definition.  Motivated by the desire to see that which was promised 
by opposition politicians during the euphoria surrounding the March Events, mainly 
constitutional and governmental reform, the opposition was acceptant of the 
consequences involved in initiating the first major anti-government protest since the 
March Events.  While the grouping began with the frame, “reforms, reforms, reforms,” in 
April 2006, opposition leaders extrapolated their original frame to an actual platform a 
month later during the May 2006 rally, a move representing the clearest step yet towards 
definition.  The May 2006 platform read: 
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1) a new draft constitution; 2) the punishment of those responsible for the 
shooting of demonstrators in Aksy in March 2002; 3) an end to "family 
business" and a real fight against corruption; 4) guarantees of freedom of 
the press; 5) economic reform, including the return of all economic 
functions to the cabinet; 6) a stepped-up fight against crime; 7) an end to 
the use of state-controlled media to denigrate political opponents; 8) an 
end to monopolization and price-gouging in the construction sector; 9) 
compensation for merchants' losses in looting during the night of March 
24, 2005; and 10) an end to "unconstitutional" attempts to limit free 
speech and demonstrations.128 
 
These demands were a major evolution from the demands of April 2006 
and represented the first time in the post-Akaev era when major opposition politicians 
attempted to frame a message for not just the event, but for the movement.  By 
enumerating the concerns and issues of the day, the opposition was able to distinguish not 
just their desires, but the Bakiev administration’s shortcomings—a fact not lost on 
Bakiev in the run-up to the November protests.   
Although May 2006 represented a major evolution of the opposition 
frame, the opposition would have to wait almost a year until the April 2007 protests for 
the next stage in frame development, as the November 2006 protests continued with 
constitutional reform as the centerpiece message.  Shifting the frame from weakening 
Bakiev through constitutional measures to demanding his outright resignation, the April 
2007 opposition message directly challenged the president, an evolution attributable to 
the inclusion of Feliks Kulov in the opposition movement and his nascent organization, 
United Front for a Worthy Future for Kyrgyzstan.129  Without wasting anytime, United 
Front began to frame Bakiev as unfit for office releasing a statement on 19 February 2007 
calling for early presidential elections, and by 9 March 2007, the main opposition 
organization had begun calling for fresh protests at which time the protestors would call 
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for Bakiev’s resignation, not just early elections.130  Less than a month after United Front 
called for early presidential elections, the main opposition party had not just taken on the 
same demand, but threatened President Bakiev with violence should the demands not be 
met.131  While the November 2006 protests succeeded in weakening the president, Bakiev 
still managed to come back and regain his lost constitutional powers less than two months 
later, a process that neither Kulov nor the main opposition movement wanted to see 
again.  As such, opposition efforts were combined to create a frame by which the only 
graceful exit for Bakiev was capitulation.  Unfortunately for the opposition, Bakiev’s 
outreach to the opposition in the form of a request to form a coalition government and the 
naming a leading opposition politician to the post of prime minister was enough of a 
compromise as to help shed the image of a president unwilling to work with the 
opposition, a move that the opposition could not counter. 
2. Cultural Repertoire of Redress 
The most startling change in the post-Akaev cultural repertoire of the 
Kyrgyzstanis was the shift from a rural to an urban-centric movement.  Where the March 
2005 protestors had been able to cut the capital off from the rest of the country, the post-
Akaev movements have sought to bring the rest of the country to the capital.  Although 
protests in the regions have occurred since the March Events, none have been on the scale 
of the protests occurring in Bishkek.  From this change in location arises the question of 
whether or not the composition of the protestors has also changed?  Informing the answer 
to this question are two major factors: firstly, as many of the current major opposition 
politicians are from the provinces, just as during the March Events, they have enjoyed the 
support of their rural constituents and most likely continue to do so; secondly, there is no 
hard evidence suggesting that the protestors have changed completely from rural to 
urban, yet rumors persist that non-Bishkek residents have been the main participants in 
the protests.  Further, the Akmatbaev affair is a perfect example of rural protestors from 
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Issyk-Kul descending upon the capital to demonstrate in support of their politician.  
Holding events relatively constant for protestor composition, the change in locale 
suggests that protestors’ perception of access to power has undergone a dramatic 
transformation.  Whereas Bishkek saw meager and ineffective protests during the Akaev 
era, the capital city has been subject to almost a constant stream of protests since the 
spring of 2005, including the cases examined herein and others.   
a. The Akmatbaev Affair 
The success of the Akmatbaev affair was primarily due to alacrity and 
discipline, as Akmatbaev was able to mobilize many supporters in a short time frame, all 
of whom followed his direction.  In two instances, spanning five months, comprising 
eight total days, with supporters numbering between 500 and 2,000, and employing the 
same elements of the cultural repertoire of the March Events, Akmatbaev managed more 
success in less time than any other single protest event in post-Akaev Kyrgyzstan.  To 
begin with, both protest events, the death of Tynchbek Akmatbaev and Rysbek 
Akmatbaev’s disqualification, demanded and received a personal response from 
Bakiev.132  More remarkable than Bakiev’s presence at each event was the protestors’ 
acceptance of Bakiev’s repeated suggestion to await the results the legal system, a 
suggestion far short of protestor demands.  Given Akmatbaev’s reputation, the possibility 
for criminal behavior was on the minds of the security forces, yet according to one 
account, Akmatbaev’s supporters actually aided the law enforcement agencies in 
apprehending a thief.133  Moreover, the security services were impressed by the conduct 
of the protests;  
Our bureaucrats need to learn from these guys.  Look at their discipline, 
their organisation! When they left, they did it in three hours’ time, and 
didn’t leave behind so much as a handful of litter. They had rubbish bins, 
they had portable toilets, they had communications – they all had cell 
phones, and some even had satellite phones. They kept their voices down 
when they talked – they’re competent, all right.134 
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In conducting the protests with such discipline and order, despite the 
concerns of criminality, Akmatbaev demonstrated that that a small, but disciplined group 
of protestors was worthy of attention from the highest halls of office, and by conceding to 
the president’s suggestion of not prolonging his demonstration to the point of 
confrontation with the security forces, Akmatbaev maintained control over the not just 
the situation, but the larger issues at hand.  Unfortunately, for his supporters, Rysbek 
Akmatbaev proved to be the “center of gravity” in Clausewitzian terms, when after his 
murder, not only was there was no leader, but there was also no cause around which to 
rally, suggesting a rational-choice paradigm of motivation. 
b. The Opposition 
Concomitant with shifting the center of protest from a rural to an urban 
setting was a reduction in the opposition’s cultural repertoire as well.  First and foremost, 
two of the three most influential techniques, road blockades and extended marches, were 
no longer available by virtue of geography.  As for the third option, occupying 
administration buildings, what ever vestige of hope opposition leaders had of employing 
this technique against capital security forces was quashed when the Bakiev 
administration pre-emptively accused the opposition of plotting a coup prior to both the 
November 2006 and April 2007 protests.135  In so doing, the administration removed yet 
another method of redress from the cultural repertoire and positioned itself to take 
preventative physical action against even the possibility of building seizure by the 
protestors.   
With a reduced cultural repertoire, the opposition’s new challenge lay in 
convincing Bakiev that while not representing a threat, the movement still demanded 
attention.  To meet this challenge, the opposition focused on expansion of the single-day 
protests of April and May 2006 to multi-day protest events for the November 2006 and 
April 2007 protests, thus dictating a tantamount expansion of protestor participation.  
Specifically, the November 2006 protests aimed at achieving long promised 
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constitutional reforms that devolved more power to the parliament, whereas in April 2007 
the opposition increased the gravity of demands calling for early presidential elections 
and Bakiev’s resignation.  In light of the reduced cultural repertoire and these non-trivial 
demands, the opposition attempted to muster a force sufficient enough to motivate 
Bakiev to act, however, this logic proved faulty.  The brief but active history of protest in 
post-Akaev Kyrgyzstan reveals that past events tend to dictate presidential action more so 
than the events of the present.  That is to say, the historical memory of the previous 
protest, November 2006, motivated Bakiev to a greater extent than did the mass build up 
of protestors during April 2007.   
In the context of the November 2006 protests, Bakiev’s five-day delay in 
submitting his promised constitutional proposals was directly informed by the April and 
May 2006 single-day events.  Fully aware that the November 2006 protests were the first 
attempt at the multi-day protest format, Bakiev waited to see how much “steam” the 
opposition could muster and maintain before taking any action.  By drawing large crowds 
during the November 2006 protests, the opposition did pressure Bakiev to eventually act, 
but not in the manner desired, and only after he initially balked at the first five days of 
protest.  On 6 November when Bakiev did finally submit his draft constitution minus the 
agreed upon concessions, he was forced to confront a wholly new situation for which he 
was not prepared.   
Bakiev’s actions in March 2007, during the run-up to the April protests, 
revealed the historical effect of the November 2006 protests.  By April 2007, Bakiev 
faced major problems directly and indirectly related to the previous round of opposition 
protests, not the least of which was his reversal of constitutional concessions.  More 
specifically, the November 2006 protests were well attended, prolonged, and initially 
achieved their stated goals, all resulting in a relatively successful protest event for the 
opposition.  In an attempt to stave off a repeat of the November 2006 protests, Bakiev 
made pre-emptive concessions by choosing a prime minister from the opposition, inviting 
the opposition into a coalition government, and reforming the state-run television station 
into a public station.  Despite such unprecedented concessions by the president, the 
opposition went ahead with the planned protests, but failed to achieve its stated goals of 
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early presidential elections and Bakiev’s resignation.  Instead the government-initiated 
crackdown proved to be the defining moment of the protest event, as the opposition never 
recovered.  Although in making such major concessions to the opposition ahead of the 
planned protests, Bakiev evolved from his November 2006 position of initial reluctance 
to tacit appeasement, yet shortly thereafter in suppressing the actual protest events, 
Bakiev reverted to a position of intolerance.  Deciphering down which path Bakiev will 
trod is a puzzle left to the next round of protests, when the effects of the April 2007 
events will dictate action. 
D. PEASANT REBELLION THEORY 
1. The Akmatbaev Affair 
The actions of the peasantry in the Akmatbaev affair are inherently risk-neutral in 
that the entire affair was an attempt to gain political ground.  From the resignation of the 
prime minister to the candidacy of a reputed criminal for a parliamentary seat, the 
protestors had nothing to loose and sought to change the status quo to their advantage.  
Indeed the rhetoric surrounding the initial protests after the death of Tynchbek 
Akmatbaev revealed a peasantry challenging not only the status quo, but the very 
authority of the government.  In essence, the protestors attempted to seize upon the 
opportunity to push Kulov from office as retribution for the death of Akmatbaev, an 
inherently dangerous proposition given Kulov’s position as prime minister and Rysbek 
Akmatbaev’s history of criminality.  Further, the protests surrounding the candidacy of 
Rysbek Akmatbaev also sought to challenge the status quo by instituting the will of the 
people in place of the constitutional order.  While the confusion surrounding the Central 
Election Commission’s decision appears to lend salience to a loss-averse peasantry 
advocating for their candidate, such an assessment fails to take into account the larger 
picture of Akmatbaev’s questionable candidacy.  The peasantry was not attempting to 
maintain the status quo within the contested constituency, i.e., maintaining an 
“Akmatbaev” in power; rather they were attempting to challenge the system by 
demanding that Rysbek Akmatbaev, while under criminal investigation, be allowed to 
run for parliament.  Neither of these protests embodied loss-averse behavior, rather the 
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peasantry, led by Akmatbaev, attempted to gain political power from where no previously 
existed.  Moreover, upon the death of Rysbek Akmatbaev the peasantry ceased to 
demonstrate, suggesting that they were not motivated by the desire to recoup a loss, as in 
the loss-averse paradigm, but employed a standard cost-benefit analysis that no longer 
became feasible after the second brother’s death. 
2. The Opposition 
The move to urban-based protests undoubtedly influenced the composition of the 
opposition movement.  Anecdotal evidence from journalistic accounts of the protests 
maintains that opposition protests still had a definite peasant component; however, the 
exact composition is unknown.  As explained to the author by an NGO representative, the 
peasant component was one of three forces involved in the Bishkek protests at the end of 
the March Events, with the other two forces being the Southern political clans and NGO 
supporters.136  .   
Examining the actions of the opposition protestors across the April 2006-2007 
timeframe reveals a loss-averse peasantry primarily motivated by the desire to recoup that 
which was promised during the euphoria surrounding the March Events, and the 
November 2006 protests, but not delivered.  By taking the mantle as the opposition leader 
during the March Events and in turn, capitalizing on that position to run for the 
presidency, Bakiev’s campaign promises of 2005 took on not just Kyrgyzstan’s future but 
the country’s past as well.  That is to say, by mid-2006, Bakiev’s unfulfilled campaign 
promises of constitutional and governmental reform had the added effect of devaluing all 
that was accomplished during the March Events.  Reluctant to lose the momentum for 
political reform, the peasantry rallied to protest on multiple occasions in 2006, and in 
April 2007.  Adding to the frustration of the peasantry leading up to the April 2007 rallies 
was the passage of time without the passage of reform.  Despite the multiple instances of 
protest during 2006, of which the November 2006 protest was a brief bright spot, 
Bakiev’s promises were not just unfulfilled, but his actions gave rise to the belief that his 
promises would remain unfulfilled.  By reversing the protestor-led constitutional reforms 
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of November 2006, Bakiev effectively shut out the will of the people in favor of his own 
desire for power.  The whole experience sent two different messages; firstly, the power of 
peasant protest in November 2006 had induced Bakiev to capitulate to protestor demands, 
proving that loss-recuperation was possible; and secondly, the constitutional reform 
reversal of December 2006 signaled the weakness of parliamentary opposition leadership.    
With the addition of Kulov to the opposition leadership came a change in rhetoric 
but not peasant motivation, which proved to be a dangerous combination.  At no point 
during the April 2007 protest event did the peasantry alter the cultural repertoire from 
that which was employed in the 2006 protests, seemingly suggesting that their 
participation was contingent on the same motivating factors of loss-recuperation as had 
been the case in the previous year.  The opposition leadership however, chose to change 
the group’s rhetoric from seeking constitutional reforms to seeking Bakiev’s resignation, 
thus in combination with the peasant presence eliciting the most violent government 
response to date.  Unlike the Kara-Buura or Aksy events, when loss-averse protestor 
rhetoric and action challenged authority through audacious behavior, the April 2007 
protests were marked by challenging rhetoric, but standard action.  Rather than 
attempting an outright takeover of power through bold action, the peasantry appeared 
willing to “wait out” the Bakiev administration.  Given that the Bakiev administration 
had already rescinded protestor-led constitutional reforms, and instituted an opposition-
led government, the president’s desire to maintain power ultimately prevailed yet again. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The consequences of both the Akmatbaev affair and the opposition movement are 
far ranging for the Kyrgyzstani populace as the two situations offer a general, but not 
complete, departure from the March Events.  Where one movement was reliant on a small 
but disciplined group of protestors, the other came to advocate large and vociferous 
gatherings, yet both intersecting in the capital city, at the office of the president.  In 
contrast to the March Events, both the Akmatbaev and opposition movement case studies 
began and ended with petitioning Bakiev.  Unlike the March Events, the Akmatbaev 
frame attacked Kulov the individual instead of his entire government, which proved to be 
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effective in the second instance.  Similarly, the opposition movement attacked Bakiev, 
the president, not his institutions, as many of the opposition leaders were members of 
such institutions.   
Although the change of location proved restrictive for the opposition’s cultural 
repertoire, the grouping was able to overcome by increasing the intensity of protests in 
terms of both time and participation.  Contrast that pattern with the small but disciplined 
protests of the Akmatbaev supporters and no single model emerges as more effective than 
the other, rather the only inference that can be drawn is that the overall paradigm of urban 
protest was reshaped dramatically by the recent events. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses the evolution of protest in Kyrgyzstan from 2000 to the 
present in four parts.  The next section examines how time and space have impacted 
Kyrgyzstani protest, while the following section analyzes the patterns of peasant 
participation in political protest.  The subsequent section considers the limits to the 
theoretical framework.  Lastly, the final section explores the implications of continued 
protest on the development of democracy in Kyrgyzstan. 
B. THE IMPACT OF TIME AND SPACE ON PROTEST 
Protest in the Akaev era was marked by the ability of an aggrieved party to 
project a cause beyond the local constituency for an indefinite period of time.  Of the 
three incidents under examination in the Akaev era, Aksy and the March Events are 
distinguished from Kara-Buura in that the latter was limited by time and space, which 
ultimately became the arbiter of success.  Since the issue at hand in Kara-Buura 
surrounded the parliamentary election results, the protestors were beholden to the 
parliamentary election cycle in ways that did not constrain the Aksy grouping.  With the 
parliamentary election cycle inherently limiting the time frame available for protest to 
only immediately preceding, during and succeeding the poll, the ability of the Kara-
Buura demonstrators to expand the period of protest was greatly reduced.  Furthermore, 
control over the election cycle, and hence the available period of protest, resided not with 
the angered constituency but with the institutions headed by Akaev, which meant that the 
Kara-Buura grouping was protesting both against Akaev and according to Akaev’s 
schedule.  Five years later, in the week prior to the 2005 parliamentary elections when 
protests erupted across the country, Akaev’s control over the election cycle was lost 
before the first round of voting had even begun.  By employing the cultural repertoire of 
protests, road blockades, marches and occupation of public spaces, the March Events 
protestors of the pre-election period laid the foundation to effectively remove the 
standard time frame limitations imposed by an election cycle, which was confirmed by 
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the post-round one explosion of opposition occupied territories.  Further in finding 
common ground with protestors in multiple regions, the leaders of the March Events were 
able to project the idea of a national crisis enveloping the country, as opposed to the 
events in Kara-Buura of 2000, in which case the disturbance only occurred in a single 
section of the country.  Through failure the Kara-Buura protestors revealed the necessity 
for demonstrators to control the period of protest in order to meet with success.   
Just as important as the need to control the timeframe of protest was the necessity 
to project a local cause onto the national scene, a revelation that did not occur until two 
years later with Aksy.  Beknazarov’s undue persecution at the hands of the Akaev 
regime, while reminiscent of Kulov’s situation was not a priori sufficient reason to elicit 
a response from the president as the issue remained at the local level; however the deaths 
of six protestors at the hands of the security apparatus, protesting on behalf of 
Beknazarov, transformed the entire situation.  The original reason for protest, 
Beknazarov’s imprisonment, was an issue inherently limited to the Aksy constituency, 
but the shootings dually garnered national attention and caused an expansion of 
constituent demands to include to "justice for the dead.”  With a redefined cause, the 
Beknazarov protestors became the Aksy protestors and confronted the Akaev 
administration with a level of intensity and organization never before seen, demanding 
political accountability for the shootings.  Considering that the pre-shooting protests 
occurred outside of a limited setting such as an election cycle, the Aksy protestors 
essentially stumbled into a situation where their local issue had become a national one 
and where the time frame of protest was not controlled by Akaev.  Anxious to limit the 
possible political damage from the shootings, the Akaev regime performed an about-face 
and within months attempted to appease the protestors with the cabinet’s resignation.  
Where the Kara-Buura protests had proved to the Kyrgyzstani populous that organizing 
against the Akaev regime was possible, despite failure, the Aksy protests revealed that 
concessions from Akaev were also viable, provided that complete control over both time 
and space did not reside with the government. 
For the March Events, the combination of control over both time and space was 
crucial.  After the pre-election demonstrators seized control over the time frame of 
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protest, gaining control over the remaining factor, space, was only a matter of time.  With 
the ensuing coupling of the traditional opposition frame to the undeniable force of the 
newly-ordained opposition protestors, local causes combined to form a national issue.  
No longer were the initial concerns of protestors restricted to local constituencies, rather 
accountability in the White House became the new goal.  Only through gaining control 
over the regions, in essence, shrinking the area over which Akaev had control, was the 
opposition able to make such a demand as the resignation of the president, and take such 
action as the storming of the White House.   
In the post-Akaev era the propensity for protest has increased dramatically; 
however, the most vociferous protests have occurred in an urban setting, a sharp contrast 
from the regional protests of the Akaev era.  With the explosion of protests in Bishkek 
since the March Events, the Akaev era paradigm of time and space has dramatically 
changed.  Where the success of the March Events was dependent on the opposition's 
ability to expand the period of protest and move from the periphery to the center, thereby 
reducing the Akaev regime’s control, the post-Akaev paradigm has revealed a situation 
whereby the protestors maintain control of both time and space, with the government 
fighting to wrest control away.  By holding multi-day rallies in the capital at locations 
around the White House and under direct White House control, the protestors have 
established a new status quo of time and space, which has confused the presidential 
administration.  The implications for this paradigm shift are not yet known, however, the 
first major clash between the government and post-Akaev protestors occurring at the 
April 2007 protests, signaled a willingness by Bakiev to gain control over lost time and 
space.  Despite such action, primary control over the post-Akaev time and space issues of 
protest still resides with the protestors; however the government’s actions do suggest that 
the issue of control will no longer be the complete purview of one side to be leveraged 
against the other.  Instead, control over time and space will be an issue over which both 




C. PEASANT REBELLION THEORY 
Table 2.   Summation of peasant rebellion analysis 
Year Event Motive Theory 
2000 Kara-Buura Rigged elections Loss-averse 
2002 Aksy False imprisonment 
and shooting deaths 
Loss-averse 
2005 March Events Rigged Elections Loss-averse 
2005-06 Akmatbaev Affair Death and 
candidacy 
Risk-neutral 
2006-07 Opposition  Broken promises Loss-averse 
 
As seen in Table 2 of the five cases examined herein, four incidents, Kara-Buura, 
Aksy, the March Events and the opposition movement can be categorized as producing 
loss-aversion, while the Akmatbaev affair was fundamentally risk neutral.  The 
distinction between the loss-averse and risk-neutral paradigms lies in a difference of 
motivating factors for actors.  For the loss-averse actor, the prospect of recouping that 
which was lost is sufficient motivation to initiate and sustain risky action until their 
perceived losses have been restored.  For the risk-neutral actor, employing a standard 
cost-benefit analysis, the motivation to act is only sufficient when benefits of changing 
the status quo outweigh the risks of action.  For the instances of Kara-Buura, Aksy, and 
the March Events, motivation stemmed from the loss of political power, while in 2006-
2007 the opposition movement was motivated by Bakiev’s broken promises and the 
failure of the March Events to initiate promised reform.  In contrast, the Akmatbaev affair 
was strictly risk-neutral, as the peasantry protested only for new political gains, which 
when not realized, failed to motivate further protest.   
While loss-aversion was the motivating factor for the four cases, the level of 
effectiveness was directly related to the breadth of the cultural repertoire employed by 
each grouping.  In the Aksy and March Events cases, the peasantry was unencumbered in 
implementing as many techniques of redress as desired, due to their motivation to recoup 
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their losses at any cost and favorable geographic conditions.  In contrast, the peasantry of 
the opposition movement has been hampered by the move to urban-based protests and the 
ensuing restrictions of the cultural repertoire.  Moreover the success of the November 
2006 protests occurred only at a point when protestor numbers swelled greatly and 
behavior was seen as the most boisterous to date for an urban-based event, suggesting 
that even the mere threat of a return to a March Events-like cultural repertoire was 
sufficient to cause capitulation from Bakiev.  For Kara-Buura, failure stemmed not from 
motivation or employment of the cultural repertoire, but from extraneous factors such as 
location and the inability to nationalize the issue at hand.  In addition, Kara-Buura was 
the first incident of its kind in Kyrgyzstan—a major Akaev confidant had broken ranks to 
openly challenge presidential power—which meant that the peasantry was essentially 
breaking new political ground, the boundaries of which were unknown.  Aksy and the 
March Events had the benefit of historical memory from which to make decisions on how 
to proceed.   
For the Akmatbaev affair, the resolution of both the first and second round of 
protests holds the key to understanding the risk-neutral classification of the entire event.  
Like Aksy, the first round of Akmatbaev protests was the result of a death, yet unlike the 
Aksy peasantry, the Akmatbaev peasants never came close to success either partially or 
wholly.  In fact, the Akmatbaev peasantry dispersed after meeting with President Bakiev, 
falling far short of their demand for the removal of Prime Minister Kulov.  During the 
second round of protests, the Akmatbaev peasantry protested for two days until their 
demand, the reinstatement of Rysbek’s candidacy, was met, then they dispersed.  In the 
final chapter of the Akmatbaev affair, Rysbek’s murder, the peasantry did not even 
muster sufficient numbers to manage a return to Bishkek as they had in both previous 
incidents.  Moreover, the context of death as a motivator for the Akmatbaev affair is 
completely different than for the Aksy grouping.  In the case of the latter the death of the 
protestors was and continues to be a major source of motivation for action as the desire 
for “justice for the dead” still lingers in peasant memory, yet for the Akmatbaev 
peasantry, Rysbek’s death never elicited a response tantamount to the response of the 
Aksy peasants.  By dispersing so easily and quickly in each round of protests, the 
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Akmatbaev peasantry revealed behavior motivated by cost-benefit analysis, as in the first 
round they chose not to incur risk by continuing to challenge the president, while in the 
second round, the dispersed after having met with success. 
D. CONSIDERATIONS OUTSIDE THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This thesis has sought to explicate the mechanics of Kyrgyzstani protest and the 
ensuing impact on Kyrgyzstani political development.  By focusing on social 
mobilization theory in conjunction with leading theories of peasant rebellion, this thesis 
has focused on both agency-based and structural modes of explanation.  While this 
framework has served to shed light on the actions of protest in five case studies, the 
framework by no means purports to explain the whole of Kyrgyzstani political 
development.  Further research would compare this approach with alternative 
explanations based both on structural and agency-based reasoning found in recent 
scholarship on Central Asia. 
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The opposition’s struggle for political reform represents the lone case study 
examined herein that continues to the present day.  Unlike each other case, the issue of 
political reform has yet to reach a breaking point and the history of Kyrgyzstani politics 
suggests that the parties involved will continue to struggle to find a compromise.  The 
addition of Feliks Kulov has surely been a boon to the opposition, if not for his reputation 
then for his attempt to change the direction of opposition rhetoric and demands.  By 
instituting new rhetoric while maintaining the now standard cultural repertoire, Kulov is 
attempting to prepare the opposition for a long and drawn out movement that looks 
towards a post-Bakiev Kyrgyzstan.  While Bakiev's unfulfilled promises of constitutional 
reform still serve as a fertile ground for opposition frame resonance, continuing to focus 
solely on such promises does nothing to expand the opposition's platform of ideas or 
entice potential protestors to action.  In calling for early presidential elections, Kulov is 
not just challenging Bakiev's hold on power, but also challenging the president to define 
his position on multiple political issues.  If Bakiev does indeed take up the challenge and  
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establish a set of political positions, then the responsibility will fall to Kulov and the 
oppositionists to do the same or risk appearing not as visionary politicians, but leaders of 
a revolution now past. 
As protest becomes the institutionalized method of redress for an aggrieved party, 
Kyrgyzstan is engendering a scenario not yet seen in the fourth wave of democratization.  
Complicating the scenario ever further is the vibrant civil society existing in Kyrgyzstan, 
which was only a minor participant in the March Events, but has taken on a greater role 
in the post-Akaev era.  Since independence, civil society groups have worked towards 
making Kyrgyzstan a more democratic country, as defined by Kyrgyzstani society and 
partially embodied in the nascent opposition platform.  Considering that Bakiev was 
brought to office by street protests, his ensuing engagement with protesting parties does 
not come as a surprise.  However, his initial lack of attention to protestor demands was 
startling and suggestive of a return to the authoritarian ways of Akaev.  More recently his 
response to opposition demands and his willingness to fill the ranks of his cabinet with 
opposition members indicates an acknowledgement of protestor power.  Harnessing such 
power, whether through capitalizing on loss-averse or risk-neutral motives remains the 
challenge of not just the opposition movement, but any grouping of Kyrgyzstanis wishing 
to redress the government. 
While the inference that Kyrgyzstan is ruled by a mob has been made by 
international observers, this claim fails to take into account the relationship between the 
power structure and the protestors.137  Inherent in this belief is the idea that the protesting 
masses have and will continue to dictate policy prescriptions to elected officials, 
primarily to the president.  The reality on the ground however, belies this belief for two 
reasons; firstly, Bakiev’s concessions to the opposition movement, with the exception of 
the November 2006 protests, have come prior to any major protest gathering; and 
secondly, the sitting parliamentarians of the opposition leadership followed their own 
course of action, rather than their constituencies’ prescription, when forced to choose 
between the two options.138  The prime example of this behavior was the December 2006 
                                                 
137 Crisis Group, Kyrgyzstan on the Edge. 
138 Orozobekova, “Yet Another Constitution.” 
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capitulation to Bakiev over reversing the constitutional reforms gained during the 
November 2006 protests.  Rather than defend the constitutional reforms fought for by 
their constituents, and face the possibility of Parliament dissolution, the opposition 
parliamentarians sided with Bakiev.  Moreover, the motivations of the opposition rank 
and file emanate not from a desire to see a continually weak president, beholden to the 
masses, but for the need to weaken the power of the presidency in order to  strengthen 
Parliament, thus creating a greater balance of power.  This is not to say that mob rule 
would never take hold, as the dominance of the loss-averse paradigm in explanations of 
Kyrgyzstani protest definitely lays the ground work for the perception of unending 
grievances and correspondingly risky behavior to regain perceived losses. Rather the 
current situation in Kyrgyzstan is not ripe for mob rule.  Constitutional and governmental 
reforms matter to the Kyrgyzstani populace for a multitude of reasons, not the least of 
which is that power has always been vertically structured, with the president residing on 
top.  Altering the balance of power in the highest halls of the land would lay the 
foundation for a similar transformation across the board, thus giving hope to thousands of 
Kyrgyzstanis that political change is possible and possibly opening up new avenues of 
redress.  Opening up these new avenues would provide alternatives to the “street 
democracy” that marks Kyrgyzstan’s current political development. 
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